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PREDATORY LENDING, PASSIVE JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM, AND THE DUTY TO DECIDE'
SUSAN E. HAUSER**
Since 1999, the North Carolina General Assembly has enacted a
series of statutes designed to curb abusive practices in consumer
mortgage lending, including the nation's first predatory lending
law. These laws implicitly recognize that the practice of
securitization has created incentives for predatory lending
practices to develop in the home mortgage market. Against this
financial and legislative background, the North Carolina
appellate courts issued five decisions between 2003 and 2008
dealing with predatory lending issues.
This Article analyzes these five North Carolina decisions from
two perspectives: first, as demonstrating the courts' evolving
response to the widespread use of securitization, and second, as
representing fundamentally different approaches to the courts'
basic adjudicative duty. As explained in the Article, this
adjudicative duty requires judges to reach decisions that respond
to the parties' arguments with candor, respect guidance from the
legislature, and are narrowly structured so that they do not
unnecessarily preclude future legislative or judicial action on
similar issues.
Based on an examination of the judicial duty to decide, the
Article concludes that two of these five decisions, Shepard and
Skinner, illustrate a form of passive judicial activism by using
procedural doctrines to unnecessarily preclude future litigation
and supplant the ability of the legislature to act in an area where
it has expressed strong concern. Conversely, the remaining three
decisions, Melton, Richardson, and Tillman, are narrowly
decided and comply with the courts' adjudicative duty.
* Copyright © 2008 by Susan E. Hauser.
** Assistant Professor, North Carolina Central University School of Law. I am
grateful for the excellent research assistance provided by Melissa Mabelle Anderson and
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INTRODUCTION
In July of 1999, North Carolina became the first state to adopt a
predatory lending law' limiting abusive practices in home mortgage
lending.2 The law passed both houses of the General Assembly with
strong support3 and prompted Attorney General Mike Easley to
1. Senate Bill 1149 was enacted as North Carolina session law 1999-332 and codified
at various locations in chapter 24 of the North Carolina General Statutes in 1999. Act of
July 22, 1999, ch. 332, sec. 1-8, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1202.
2. There is no generally accepted definition of predatory mortgage lending, although
the term is generally used to refer to lending practices that are illegal or provide no net
benefit to the borrower. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. Most predatory
loans are also subprime loans, meaning that they are high-cost loans typically offered to
borrowers with poor credit histories. Not all subprime loans are predatory, however. See
infra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A
Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1255, 1261 (2002) (distinguishing between predatory loans and legitimate subprime loans).
3. The vote was 47:2 in the Senate and 109:9 in the House. THE COALITION FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUMMARY OF NC PREDATORY LENDING LAW,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/shortsumm.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2008).
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announce that North Carolina had adopted "the strongest law against
predatory lending in the country."4  North Carolina's ground-
breaking law generated national attention5 and was the model for
predatory lending laws adopted in other states.6
Eight years later, a national wave of foreclosures7 led to the
collapse of the subprime mortgage market,8 rocked the foundations of
leading financial institutions,9 and sent aftershocks rippling through
4. Id.
5. North Carolina's law has been the subject of empirical study, as well as much
academic discussion. See infra note 133 and accompanying text; see also Baher Azmy,
Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of
Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 361-81 (2005) (discussing the impact of North
Carolina's predatory lending law).
6. See Philip Bond, David K. Musto & Bilge Yilmaz, Predatory Lending in a Rational
World 24 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 06-2, 2006) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=875621 (reporting that North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law
is "widely regarded as the model for other states' laws"); see also Donald C. Lampe,
Wrong From the Start? North Carolina's "Predatory Lending" Law and the Practice vs.
Product Debate, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 135, 135 (2004) (noting that North Carolina's law "has
become the de facto model for state and municipal 'predatory lending' legislation,
regulation, and ordinances throughout the country.")
7. In early 2008, approximately 24% of subprime loans were delinquent or in
foreclosure, and the delinquency and foreclosure rate for all mortgages was 7.3%-the
highest level since the Mortgage Bankers Association starting tracking this data in 1979.
See Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Past Subprime Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at A19. By the end of March 2008, "[one] in [eleven] American
mortgages were [sic] past due or in foreclosure." Vikas Bajaj & Michael M. Grynbaum, A
Rising Tide of Mortgage Defaults, Not All on Risky Loans, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at
Cl.
8. A number of subprime lenders were forced to seek bankruptcy protection in 2007,
led by New Century Financial Corporation, which filed a chapter 11 petition in Delaware
on Apr. 2, 2007. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, Home Lender is Seeking
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at Cl (describing the bankruptcy of New Century
Financial Corporation); American Home Mortgage Seeks Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at C3; Subprime Lender Seeks Protection from
Creditors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, at C10 (describing the bankruptcy of Aegis
Mortgage Corporation).
9. The steep rise in foreclosures led to large losses at mainline financial institutions
in 2007. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Bear Stearns Says Battered Hedge Funds are
Worth Little, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at C2; Robin Sidel & Jeffrey McCracken,
Citigroup Model is Left Shaken by Credit Crunch, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2007, at Al;
Randall Smith, Ann Davis & Anita Raghavan, Loss Pressures Morgan Stanley CEO,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2007, at Al (reporting a $3.59 billion quarterly loss by Morgan
Stanley caused by the write-down of mortgage assets and summarizing similar losses
ranging from $8 to $14 billion suffered by Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and UBS AG). Losses
continued to threaten financial markets in 2008. On Sunday, March 16, 2008, the Federal
Reserve took a series of unprecedented steps designed "to rescue the nation's financial
markets from what officials feared could be a chain reaction of defaults." Edmund L.
Andres, Bear Stearns Sold: A Bank Rate Cut and Open-Ended Credit for Big Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at Al. The Fed's moves included the approval of a $30 billion credit
line to help JPMorgan Chase avert the collapse of Bear Stearns by acquiring it. Id. In July
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financial markets. ° Media coverage of these events highlighted the
problem of predatory mortgage lending in the public consciousness,
and led Congress to consider a variety of new federal remedies for a
quintessentially state-level problem. 1
Between these two mileposts, the North Carolina appellate
courts decided five significant cases in which consumers challenged
predatory practices in mortgage lending.12  The first of these
decisions, Melton v. Family First Mortgage Corp.,1 found against the
consumer borrowers on grounds that are consistent with North
Carolina's Predatory Lending Law. 4 The second and third decisions,
Shepard v. Ocwen Federal Bank 5 and Skinner v. Preferred Credit,6
conflict with the policies underlying the Predatory Lending Act by
establishing new hurdles for injured consumer borrowers."7 The two
of 2008, federal regulators seized IndyMac Bancorp and threatened the takeover of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, "the nation's two largest mortgage finance companies."
Stephen Labaton & Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Considers Takeover of Two Mortgage
Giants: Conservationship Is Option If Troubles Grow at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at Al; Louise Story, Regulators Seize IndyMac After a Run on
the Bank, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at C5.
10. See, e.g., Peter A. McKay, Credit Worries Send Down Dow by 172.65 Points,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at Cl; Floyd Norris, With Markets Moving Wildly, Insight
Suffers: A Few Late Mortgages Create a Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at Al;
Floyd Norris & Vikas Bajaj, Global Stock Markets Tumble Amid Deepening Credit Fears,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at Al.
11. Bills introduced in 2007 included the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory
Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110" Cong. (sponsored by Rep. Brad Miller, Rep. Melvin
Watt, and Rep. Barney Frank), the Home Ownership Preservation and Protection Act of
2007, S. 2452, 110" Cong. (sponsored by Sen. Christopher Dodd), and three separate
proposals by the 110 " Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code to allow modification of
home mortgages: S. 2136 (Sen. Richard Durbin), S. 2133 (Sen. Arlen Specter), H.R. 3609
(Rep. Miller). The only federal remedy actually enacted in 2007 was the Mortgage
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act, H.R. 3648, 110 Cong. (2007) (enacted Dec. 20, 2007 as Pub.
L. No. 110-142, 121 Stat. 1803), which amends the Internal Revenue Code to exclude the
discharge of indebtedness on a principal residence from the debtor's gross income.
12. See infra Part If.
13. 156 N.C. App. 129, 133, 576 S.E.2d 365, 368-69 (2003) (holding that only the
originator of a fraudulent mortgage, and not a successor assignee, is liable for an unfair or
deceptive trade practice under North Carolina law).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. 361 N.C. 137, 141-42, 638 S.E.2d 197, 200 (2006) (holding that a cause of action
arising from the making of an unlawful loan accrues on the date of the loan closing,
rejecting the argument that financing a usurious fee creates a continuing violation).
16. 361 N.C. 114, 119-20, 638 S.E.2d 203, 209-10 (2006) (stating that North Carolina
courts lacked personal jurisdiction over a New York trust holding the beneficial interest in
114 mortgages made with North Carolina citizens and secured by real property in North
Carolina).
17. See infra Parts II.B. and C.
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most recent decisions, Richardson v. Bank of America" and Tillman v.
Commercial Credit Loans,9 reversed this trend: both found in favor
of the consumer plaintiffs and followed the legislature's lead in
crafting effective responses to the problem of predatory mortgage
lending.2"
Predatory lending practices result, in part, from an altered
mortgage lending environment. After origination, lenders almost
universally assign subprime mortgages2 to facilitate the process of
securitization 2 Securitization fundamentally distorts the cost-benefit
analysis traditionally used in the mortgage lending industry because it
associates value with the volume of mortgages written,23 as opposed
to the ability of debtors to repay borrowed funds. This, in turn,
creates incentives for lenders to colonize new mortgage markets by
developing exotic mortgage products and offering these and other
mortgages to less creditworthy classes of borrowers.24
18. 182 N.C. App. 531, 555, 643 S.E.2d 410, 425 (2007) (holding that lender's
unauthorized sale of single-premium credit insurance for mortgage loans greater than
fifteen years was an unfair and deceptive trade practice and breached the lender's duty of
good faith and fair dealing), review allowed in part, denied in part by 361 N.C. 569, 650
S.E.2d 439 (2007), review improvidently allowed by 362 N.C. 227, 657 S.E.2d 353 (2008).
19. 362 N.C. 93, 108, 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (2008) (finding arbitration clause contained
in plaintiffs' loan agreements unconscionable and unenforceable), rev'd 177 N.C. App.
568, 629 S.E.2d 865 (2006).
20. See infra Parts II.D and E.
21. There is no standard definition of subprime loans, and it is possible to define them
either objectively or subjectively. Objectively, subprime mortgage loans are "high-rate,
high-cost home-secured loans." See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime
"HEL" Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the
Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 475 (2000). Subjectively, they are
defined by referring to the type of borrower to whom they are targeted; for example, as
"high[er]-cost home loans intended for people with weak or blemished credit histories."
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, A SNAPSHOT OF THE SUBPRIME MARKET (Nov. 28,
2007), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/snapshot-of-the-subprime-market.pdf (last
visited Aug. 23, 2008). Not all subprime loans are predatory, although most predatory
loans are also subprime loans.
22. Securitization is a financial strategy in which the originator of receivables transfers
them to another entity organized as a special purpose investment vehicle (typically a
trust). The investment vehicle then issues securities backed by the receivables that are
sold to investors in a secondary investment market. See infra notes 60-70 and
accompanying text.
23. Because a constant flow of new mortgages has been necessary to feed the demand
of institutional investors for additional mortgage-backed securities, securitization creates
incentives for mortgage originators to write as many mortgages as possible. See Mark L.
Korell, The Workings of Private Mortgage Bankers and Securitization Conduits, in A
PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 91, 96-97 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman, eds.,
2000).
24. See, e.g., EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Batista, No. 34145/06, 2007 WL 1599986, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (describing a $532,000 "2-28" adjustable rate mortgage with a balloon
payment due after 15 years).
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The willingness of some subprime lenders to disregard the
default risk25 of borrowers has been enabled, in part, by the lenders'
ability to isolate and externalize the liability associated with
individual loans by assigning these loans to other business entities.
26
If neither the originator nor the ultimate holder of the mortgage
stands to incur liability from the making of these mortgages,27
unscrupulous and short-sighted lenders are free to see more benefit
than risk in ignoring both traditional underwriting standards that
protect creditors and the consumer protection laws that protect
borrowers.28
State legislatures have led the way in recognizing that the
economic interests of mortgage originators no longer balance with the
economic interests of consumers, and North Carolina's General
Assembly has been in the vanguard of this movement. Since the
passage of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law in 1999, the
General Assembly has continued to express a strong legislative intent
to protect consumer mortgage borrowers against the impact of
securitization by passing laws to regulate mortgage professionals in
200129 and by adopting a comprehensive package of new laws in the
25. Default risk is simply the risk that the borrower will default on the loan. See infra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part IB; see also Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE
L.J. 1, 24 (1996) (describing asset securitization as "both a substitute for borrowing and a
powerful new strategy for judgment proofing" because assets are placed "in an entity
separate from the one that is at risk for liability.")
27. See Azmy, supra note 5, at 319.
The separation [of originator and noteholder] creates dangerous incentives.
Lenders can feel free to originate loans with abusive terms or without regard to
whether the borrower can afford the loan because the lender can quickly sell it off
and shift costs of foreclosure to the secondary market; brokers, who understand
that a loan will eventually be sold by the originating lender, can similarly deceive
borrowers in order to get up-front fees or make loans that carry an unreasonable
risk of default. At the same time, the secondary market's isolation from liability
eliminates incentives that might otherwise exist to police abusive terms and
practices engaged in by originating lenders; instead, lenders can collect all of the
profits from predatory loans with little risk of legal or financial consequence.
Id.
28. This phenomenon has drawn much academic attention. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert,
Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course
Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503 (2002); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy,
Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2039 (2007); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
2185 (2007).
29. North Carolina Mortgage Lending Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-243.01 to .18
(2007), amended by Act of Aug. 17, 2008, ch. 228, sec. 1-14, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws _.
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summer of 2007 designed, in part, to overrule the decisions in
Shepard and Skinner.30
As indicated by the decisions in Shepard and Skinner, North
Carolina's courts have not always been as forward-looking as the
state's legislature. This Article analyzes this series of decisions from
two perspectives: first, as demonstrating the courts' evolving
response to the widespread use of the new financial technology of
securitization, and second, as exemplifying fundamentally different
approaches to the courts' adjudicative duty. Shepard and Skinner, in
particular, have effects so contrary to the legislature's demonstrated
intent to protect consumers that they can be viewed as embodying a
form of passive judicial activism.31 Richardson and Tillman, on the
other hand, adopt a more sophisticated approach that accurately
reflects the reality of the modern mortgage market.
Part I of this Article sets the context for a discussion of these
decisions. It defines the problem of predatory lending, traces its roots
in securitization, and examines the state and federal remedies
available to injured North Carolina consumers. Part II reviews the
decisions in Melton, Shepard, Skinner, Richardson, and Tillman and
explains how these decisions either undermine or promote the
statutory protections that the North Carolina legislature provides.
Part III examines doctrines of justiciability and judicial restraint and
argues that judges may sometimes have an affirmative duty to decide
justiciable issues that fall within their jurisdiction. Part III then posits
that the decisions in Shepard and Skinner illustrate a form of passive
judicial activism in which courts use procedural doctrines to
unnecessarily preclude future litigation and supplant the ability of the
legislature to regulate business behavior and protect consumers.
Melton, Richardson and Tillman, on the other hand, are not activist
decisions. Instead, they exemplify decisional minimalism because
they are narrowly decided and are respectful of the General
Assembly's leadership in the area of predatory lending.
30. Act of July 4, 2007, ch. 163, sec. 1-2, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 269; Act of July 5, 2007,
ch. 176, sec. 1-3, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 291; Act of Aug. 16, 2007, ch. 351, sec. 1-6, 2007
N.C. Sess. Laws 1065; Act of Aug. 16, 2007, ch. 352, sec. 1-10, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1072;
Act of Aug. 16, 2007, ch. 353, sec. 1-6, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1080.
31. The term "judicial activism" refers to the judicial usurpation of legislative
functions and to the failure of judges to candidly and narrowly address legal issues placed
before them. I use the term "passive judicial activism" to refer to a court's uncompelled
use of procedural doctrines to preclude future litigation or legislative action. See infra
Part III.C.
32. See infra notes 280-90 and accompanying text.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY MORTGAGE LENDING
A. Predatory Lending
The term predatory lending describes a spectrum of abusive
practices that lenders use to gain an unfair advantage over
borrowers.33 Characteristics of predatory mortgage loans include
excessive, hidden, or illegal fees, unfairly high interest rates, charges
for unnecessary products like single-premium credit life insurance,
high loan-to-value ratios, mandatory arbitration clauses, and the use
of repeated unnecessary refinancing to deplete the owner's equity
while charging additional points and fees-a practice known as "loan
flipping."34  Predatory lending practices also include making loans
without fair consideration of the borrower's ability to repay,
concealment of the true nature or cost of the loan from the
borrower,35 negative amortization,36 and yield-spread premiums.37 As
33. From the borrower's subjective point of view, mortgage loans become predatory
when they include terms that are either illegal or that produce no net benefit to the
borrower. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:
The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2002)
(defining predatory lending as the practice of making "exploitative high-cost loans to
na''ve borrowers"). Because statutes like North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law are
aimed at regulating lender behavior, they typically take the more objective approach of
defining benchmark categories of covered loans and imposing specific requirements on
these loans.
34. For a detailed discussion of the practice and purposes of loan flipping, see
Mansfield, supra note 21, at 548.
35. Claims of fraud and unsavory practices are pervasive in predatory lending cases.
See, e.g., Indymac Bank F.S.B. v. Vicuna, 83 Pa. D. & C.4th 129, 130 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1.
2007) (fraud raised as a defense to foreclosure based on allegation that lender sold
defendant an above-market mortgage after taking advantage of defendant's limited
command of the English language); Citifinancial Mortgage Co. v. Freeman, NO. F-3151-
04, 2006 WL 1029321, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006) (defendant raised a meritorious
defense of fraud).
36. Negative amortization describes "a situation in which monthly loan payments fall
short of the actual monthly interest due on the loan. The unpaid interest, or 'deferred
interest,' is then added to the principal and begins to accrue interest itself, causing the
principal owed to increase despite the borrower's regular payments." Salois v. Dime Sav.
Bank of N.Y., FSB, 128 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1997).
37. A yield-spread premium is a financial incentive given to a mortgage broker who
finds the lowest wholesale rate available and then offers a higher interest rate to the
borrower. See Les Christie, Yield Spread Premiums Can Bite You, CNNMONEY.COM,
July 5, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/07/02/real-estate/yield-spread-premium-
demystified/index.htm.
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a whole, these lending practices are considered abusive because they
benefit the lender while providing no net benefit to the borrower.38
Compounding the abuse, predatory lending practices have been
heavily marketed to groups perceived by lenders as financially
unsophisticated,39 including low-income,4" elderly,4 and minority
borrowers.42 Numerous empirical studies have documented that
predatory lenders disproportionately target consumers on the basis of
their race43 or age." As one loan officer candidly explained, "If
someone appeared uneducated, inarticulate, was a minority, or was
particularly old or young, I would try to include all the [insurance]
',45coverages ....
38. Cf. Engel & McCoy, supra note 28, at 2043 (describing predatory lending as "a
syndrome of loan abuses that benefit mortgage brokers, lenders, and securitizers to the
serious detriment of borrowers.")
39. A number of predatory lending cases allege "reverse redlining" by lenders.
Reverse redlining is the practice of extending credit on unfair terms to specific geographic
areas based on the income, race, or ethnicity of residents. See, e.g., Assoc. Home Equity
Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
40. Cf. Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the
Military: The Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
653, 679 (2005) (documenting the marketing of predatory loans to junior enlisted military
personnel described as "low-wage entry-level workers").
41. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND
STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 25 (2004).
42. See Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is
Not Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1777, 1794 (2004) (concluding that "[tlhe
connection between predatory mortgage lending and race is unmistakable: Predatory
lenders target black and Hispanic homeowners")
43. See, e.g., ACORN HOUS. CORP., FORECLOSURE EXPOSURE: A STUDY OF RACIAL
AND INCOME DISPARITIES IN HOME MORTGAGE LENDING IN 172 AMERICAN CITIES
(2007) (describing a nationwide pattern of racial disparities in loans issued to homeowners
with similar incomes); DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST & WEI LI,
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES (2006) (analyzing subprime
mortgage pricing, controlling for legitimate risks, and concluding that African-American
and Latino borrowers are more likely to receive higher-rate subprime loans than white
borrowers); U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS, & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN IN BALTIMORE:
INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING (2000) (analyzing
discriminatory patterns of subprime mortgage originations in the Baltimore metropolitan
area in 1998).
44. See, e.g., Kellie Kim-Sung & Sharon Hermanson, Experiences of Older Refinance
Mortgage Loan Borrowers: Broker- and Lender-Originated Loans, DATA DIG. 83 (AARP
Pub. Policy Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2003, at 2-3, available at
http://www.aarp.org/research/credit-debt/mortgages/experiences-of-olderrefinance_
mortgage.loan-borro.html; Neal Walters & Sharon Hermanson, Older Subprime
Refinance Mortgage Borrowers, DATA DIG. 74 (AARP Pub. Policy Inst., Washington,
D.C.), July 2002, at 1, available at http://www.aarp.org/research/credit-debt/mortgages/
aresearch-import-184-DD74.html.
45. Declaration of Gail Kubiniec, FTC v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 1:01-CV-00606, 1 10
(N.D. Ga. 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/foia/citigroup.pdf. This statement by Ms.
1510 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86
The largest empirical study of predatory lending in North
Carolina4 6 assumes that most predatory loans are also subprime
loans," and then traces patterns within a database of 3.3 million loans
from 1998 to 2002.48 This study finds that "subprime mortgage
originations are three times more common in low-income
neighborhoods than in high-income neighborhoods and five times
more common in black neighborhoods than in white ones.
Furthermore, homeowners in high-income black neighborhoods are
twice as likely as homeowners in low-income white neighborhoods to
have subprime loans."49 Other studies have confirmed pronounced
racial disparities in the issuance of subprime loans, even among
homebuyers with similar incomes.50
A separate set of studies found older borrowers are
disproportionately represented in the subprime lending market,
particularly the subprime refinance market.51 "[P]oor, elderly persons
are often illiterate and/or unsophisticated and/or too ill, either
physically or mentally, to carefully read and comprehend a
complicated sheaf of mortgage loan documents. 5 2 Elderly persons
are particularly vulnerable to harm from predatory mortgage lending
Kubiniec, a CitiFinancial loan officer, has been widely reported. See, e.g., Nikitra S.
Bailey, Attack of the Loan Sharks, MSMAGAZNE, Jan. 1, 2008, at 12; Anita F. Hill,
Women and the Subprime Crunch, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 2007, at 11A.
46. Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, Assessing the
Impact of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 573, 573
(Fannie Mae Foundation 2004).
47. Because of the difficulty of obtaining data on predatory loans, some empirical
studies use subprime loans as a proxy for the smaller subset of predatory loans. This has
drawn criticism, since not all subprime loans are abusive. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
BANKING, Hous., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 106TH CONG., REPORT OF THE STAFF TO
CHAIRMAN GRAMM ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES (2000).
48. Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note 46, at 573.
49. Id. at 575-76.
50. See FORECLOSURE ExPOSURE, supra note 43, at 1.
Nationally, African-American home purchasers were 2.7 times more likely to be
issued a high-cost loan than white borrowers. Latinos were 2.3 times more likely
to be issued a high cost home purchase loan than white borrowers... . These
racial disparities persist even among homeowners of the same income level. In
comparative terms, upper-income African-Americans were 3.3 times more likely
than upper-income whites to be issued a high-cost loan when purchasing a home.
Upper-income Latinos were 3 times more likely than upper-income whites to be
issued a high-cost loan when purchasing a home.
Id.
51. See Kim-Sung & Hermanson, supra note 44, at 3; Walters & Hermanson, supra
note 44, at 1.
52. Donna S. Harkness, Predatory Lending Prevention Project: Prescribing a Cure for
the Home Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 43 (2000).
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because home equity generally comprises a substantial portion of
their net worth and their decreased earning capacity makes recovery
from financial harm difficult.1
3
By definition, subprime loans carry a greater risk of default than
prime loans.' 4 Default risk is a normal part of the lending process,
and it is accounted for through an informed assessment of the
borrower, as well as by application of the basic economic principle
that the assumption of a higher risk by a lender demands a
correspondingly higher return." By definition, subprime mortgage
loans carry higher interest rates than prime loans;56 however, other
ways of accounting for the default risk of subprime borrowers have
sometimes been disregarded. For example, many subprime lenders
issued "no-doc" loans,57 even though such loans, at first blush, would
seem to run counter to the lender's own self-interest.
Empirical and anecdotal evidence supports the existence of a
category of subprime mortgage loans that can fairly be characterized
as predatory.58 In connection with these loans, lenders have been
willing to ignore the default risk of the borrower and have also been
willing to incur the risk of legal liability associated with the
53. See Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing
Debt Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Considerations, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 167, 171-81 (2007).
54. See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 5, at 305 (noting that "[l]egitimate subprime loans
carry interest rates or origination charges higher than conventional prime loans in order to
compensate for generally higher risks").
55. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 45 (10th ed. 2004) (stating that "as
risk rises, expected rate of return or required payment will rise").
56. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
57. A "no-doc" loan is one in which the borrower is not required to provide
documentary evidence of income. The issuance of no-doc loans, also known as
"exceptions," by subprime lenders has been extensively documented. See, e.g., Vikas
Bajaj & Jenny Anderson, Inquiry Focuses on Withholding of Data on Loans, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2008, at Al.
58. See supra notes 43-46 for studies providing empirical evidence of predatory
lending. Other evidence is provided by reported cases dealing with loans that are arguably
predatory. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Church, No. 04L-10-042, 2006 WL 2194738, at *1 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2006) (borrower alleged forged mortgage for home repairs that were never
provided); Assoc. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 534 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001) (describing a predatory "home repair" loan extended to a 74-year old
borrower who had lived in her home for 40 years); Deutesche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v.
Castellanos, No. 22375/06, 2007 WL 1378059, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (defining
predatory loans as those "made on the basis of the value of the property, not the ability of
the borrower to repay"); Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Clouden, 2007 WL 2709996, at
*2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (same).
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origination of unfair, fraudulent, or discriminatory loans.59 These
practices raise a fundamental question: What economic incentives
motivate a lender to incur such heightened risks? To answer this
question, we must examine the process of securitization and refine
the definition of "lender" in light of this process.
B. Securitization
Securitization, also known as structured finance,60 "refers to the
pooling of financial assets, such as mortgage loans, and the issuance
of securities representing interests in the pool of assets. 61 Any group
of similar financial assets that generate cash flows can be securitized
and thereby made liquid, even if the underlying assets themselves are
not marketable standing alone.62  Thus, from the standpoint of the
entity that originates the asset, securitization provides a method to
transform illiquid income-producing assets into cash and is attractive
as an easily accessible source of capital.63
"In a typical [securitization], a company that seeks to raise cash
[sells selected] assets to a special purpose vehicle or trust ... that is
organized in such a way that the likelihood of its bankruptcy is
remote."'  After the sale, the special purpose vehicle ("SPY") owns
59. Interestingly, the agencies responsible for rating mortgage-backed securities were
quite aware of the risk of liability posed by state predatory lending laws and accounted for
this risk by refusing to rate securities backed by mortgage pools that included mortgages
from states with particularly aggressive laws. See generally David Reiss, Subprime
Standardization: How Ratings Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the
Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 985 (2006) (describing the impact of
rating agency action on predatory lending laws in Georgia and New Jersey). No similar
alarm was raised in response to structural incentives that might lead the originators of
securitized loans to disregard underwriting standards.
60. The terms "securitization" and "structured finance" are frequently used
interchangeably. See Peterson, supra note 28, at 2186 n.1 (discussing the usage of the two
terms).
61. Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994: Extending
Liability for Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market Participants, 18
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 151, 160-61 (2005).
62. See Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1668 (2004) ("Securitization transforms somewhat liquid unrated
receivables into highly liquid rated securities that can be sold in the capital markets"). For
a detailed explanation of securitization in the home mortgage industry, see Peterson, supra
note 28.
63. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
133, 136 (1994).
64. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF ASSET SECURITIZATION 1 (1st ed. 1990). The concept of "bankruptcy remoteness"
refers to the insulation of the assigned assets from the risk that the originator of those
assets might file bankruptcy. The assignment of the assets to a separate entity removes
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the assets,65 and the SPV-not the originator-issues securities to
investors. The SPV backs the issued securities with cash flows from
the underlying assets. These securities are generically called asset-
backed securities' because they are "intended to be payable
ultimately and over time from collections on the receivables"67 that
the SPV purchases. The asset-backed securities are made more
attractive to investors through credit enhancements and grading of
risk by professional ratings agencies." "This series of transactions
leaves the investors with claims against the SPV, the SPV with the
assets transferred by the originator, and the originator with the
proceeds of the sale transaction.
69
Circular financial conduits between the mortgage brokers who
originate the underlying loans and the institutions that form the
secondary market of investors in mortgage-backed securities facilitate
the securitization of the subprime mortgage market. When the initial
broker sells mortgage-backed securities to investors in the secondary
market, it generates capital to fund further mortgage originations.7"
Effectively, the secondary market enables the demand for subprime
mortgages by providing a ready supply of capital to the mortgage
brokers who originate them.
them from the originator's potential estate in bankruptcy, thereby making them appear
safer to potential investors. See, e.g., Lopucki, supra note 26, at 24-26.
65. The SPV is typically an investment trust, but it may also be organized as another
business form. The trust is a preferred structure "because under law it is exempt from
taxes, permits the originator to treat the transaction as a loan sale, and reduces liability for
the originator and issuer." Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American
Finance, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 1, 3-4 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman
eds., 2000). By its nature, a trust is inherently more passive than operating business forms
like corporations.
66. As a class, these types of securities are also called synthetic securities or
derivatives. Individual issues will have more specific names that reference the underlying
assets or characteristics of payment. For example, mortgage-backed securities may be
called just that, or may be called collateralized mortgage obligations or residential
mortgage-backed securities. Other securities may be sold to investors as interest-only
strips or principal-only strips.
67. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LISSA LAMKIN BROOME,
SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 7 (LexisNexis 2004).
68. See Reiss, supra note 59.
69. Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL.
L. REV. 101, 103 (1997).
70. Securitization is often described as a "form of capital formation because it gives
originators of... receivables an additional way to raise capital to finance their operations
or to extend credit to consumers." Plank, supra note 62 at 1656-57; see also Engel &
McCoy, supra note 28, at 2065 (noting that the advantages of securitization "are
particularly strong for small or poorly capitalized lenders" because "aggregation enables
marginal lenders to obtain financing despite obscure or questionable reputations").
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Institutional investors have been eager to drive this demand
because the resulting mortgage-backed securities have offered
perceived advantages over other comparable investments like
government or corporate bonds.71 In fact, the desirability of these
investments has created institutional demand for larger numbers of
residential mortgage originations72  because mortgage-backed
securities have offered investors higher yields than bonds, along with
the assurance that the correspondingly higher investment risks can be
known and controlled.73  Securitization relies on a number of
structural and legal devices to provide investors with these assurances
of risk control.
First, the aggregation of large numbers of mortgages into
income-producing pools theoretically mitigates the risk of borrower
default for the investor. Credit enhancements required by agencies
that rate securities before they are sold to investors further reduce the
risk of default.74 Finally, credit ratings themselves comfort investors,
because they appear to objectively assess the risk associated with
particular investments.7 5
Second, securitization allows the investor to avoid the
operational risks associated with the potential bankruptcy of the
originator or SPV. The sale of the underlying assets removes them
from the potential bankruptcy estate of the originator, thereby
shielding the investor from the risk of the originator's bankruptcy.76
To preserve the advantage of "bankruptcy-remoteness," the SPV's
organizational structure typically limits its business activities to
71. SECURITIZATION: ASSET-BACKED AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 1-10
to 1-13 (Ronald S. Borod ed., 2004) (listing the benefits of securitization to investors as
including: yield, relative liquidity, prepayment predictability, and entrance into the
consumer credit market).
72. See Korell, supra note 23, at 97. ("To meet this need and profit from it, you must
have a wide range of home loan product coming into your inventory or warehouse. The
loan flow must be sufficient to fill up a fifteen-year bucket or pool, a thirty-year pool, a
one-year adjustable loan pool, and a LIBOR-based pool on a timely basis. Only with a
large flow of multiple product originations can you create the efficient, large-size
securitization issues that the market will find particularly attractive.")
73. SECURITIZATION: ASSET-BACKED AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES,
supra note 71 at 1-10, 1-11 ("The principal attraction for investors of mortgage-backed
securities (MBS), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), and asset-backed
securities (ABS) is yield. Both types of securities have large enough spreads over
comparable Treasuries to compensate for any credit risk or prepayment risk associated
with the pooled assets.")
74. See Kendall, supra note 65, at 4.
75. Id.
76. Plank, supra note 62, at 1661-62 (discussing the "disaggregation of risk"
associated with the originator's operations).
[Vol. 861514
2008] PREDA TORY LENDING 1515
prevent non-investor creditors from incurring claims that could
trigger a bankruptcy petition by or against the SPV.77 For this reason,
the servicing of the mortgage will be performed by a separate
operating entity, the "servicer."' 8
Third, securitization is attractive to investors because it allows
the SPV to divide the risks associated with the underlying assets and
sell "the risks off to the investors most able (or willing) to bear that
particular type of risk."79 The designer of the SPV is able to carve the
cash flows from the underlying mortgages into discrete payment
streams, called tranches, each with different characteristics. 0 This is
done by structuring the cash flows from a large group of mortgages
into synthetic payment streams grouped by common characteristics
like time of payment or credit risk.81 This allows the creation of
classes of derivative asset-backed investments tailored to the needs of
institutional investors interested in investments with very specific risk
profiles.82
Finally, because mortgage notes are negotiable instruments,83
securitization triggers the "holder in due course" doctrine and
shelters the holder of the note from much of the liability associated
77. See SCHWARCZ, MARKELL & BROOME, supra note 67, at 6-8, 85-88.
78. See Katherine M. Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage
Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2008) (describing the nature and purposes of
mortgage servicing).
79. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 71
(Foundation Press 2002).
80. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 172-73 (1997) (discussing the use of commercial
investment trusts for this purpose).
81. For example, an investor may purchase an interest in a tranche structured out of
mortgage cash flows received in the first two years of the life of the underlying mortgages.
Because the risk of prepayment is lower during this life stage of the mortgages, the risk
associated with the investment will also be correspondingly lower. See Kendall, supra note
65, at 8-11.
82. Neil Kochen, Securitization from the Investor View: Meeting Investor Needs with
Products and Price, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 103, 111 (Leon T. Kendall &
Michael J. Fishman eds., 2000).
83. '[N]egotiable instrument' means an unconditional promise or order to pay a
fixed amount of money, with or without interest ... , if it: (1) is payable to bearer
or to order ... ; (2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and (3) does not
state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering
payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or
order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect
collateral to secure payment.
U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2002). This definition encompasses standard promissory notes secured
by real property.
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with the making of the mortgage.' 4 Securitization results in a
horizontally segmented lending process in which the tasks of funding,
originating, servicing, and holding mortgage loans are performed by
legally unrelated business entities.85 This organizational structure
separates the holder 86 of the mortgage from all other aspects of the
lending process.87
To the extent that the holder qualifies as a holder in due course
for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code, the holder is shielded
from most claims and defenses that the borrower8 8 could assert
against the original lender. As a holder in due course, the
assignee/holder is subject only to a restricted list of "real" defenses,
including infancy, extreme duress, lack of capacity, illegality, fraud in
the factum, and discharge in bankruptcy. 89 The borrower may not
raise a long list of "personal" defenses, including fraud in the
inducement and mistake, against a holder in due course.9" The holder
in due course doctrine thus reduces the risk of nonpayment to the
investor who is the ultimate beneficiary of the mortgage payments
due to the holder.91
Originally, the holder in due course doctrine was intended to
promote access to capital by making negotiable instruments freely
transferable.92 Today, the easy availability of consumer credit has
84. A holder in due course is "(1) a holder (2) of a negotiable instrument who took it
(3) for value (4) in good faith [and] (5) without notice of certain problems with the
instrument." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
509 (5h ed. 2000); see also U.C.C. § 3-302(a) (2002).
85. Although these entities are legally distinct, the consumer borrower may perceive
any of these entities as his or her "lender."
86. The "holder" of a negotiable instrument payable to bearer is the person in
possession of the instrument. See U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2003). If the instrument is payable
to the order of an identified person, only that person may be the holder and then only if he
or she has possession of the instrument. See id. In the world of securitized mortgages, the
holder is the SPV.
87. Predatory lending cases typically focus on the origination of the loan; however,
the segmentation of the lending process creates the potential for abuse by the servicer as
well. See Porter, supra note 78.
88. The borrower is the "maker"-the person "who signs or is identified in a note as a
person undertaking to pay" the negotiable instrument. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (2003).
89. § 3-305(a)(1). Real defenses are supported by policies that override the policy
involved in the marketability of the paper.
90. § 3-305(b). See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 84, at 542-46.
91. Investors may also be protected by contract provisions giving the holder recourse
against the originator in the event of the borrower's default. See Eggert, supra note 28, at
548. These provisions, however, do not impact the borrower's remedies against the
holder.
92. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of
Form Over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 376 (2002);
see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 84, at 507 (holder in due course doctrine
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rendered this rationale obsolete in the consumer context. Modern
consumers have no difficulty obtaining credit, and accordingly there is
little reason for the holder in due course doctrine to apply to
instruments executed by consumers. 93 In recognition of this, the
Federal Trade Commission's "Holder Rule"94 has negated the holder
in due course rule in most sales of consumer goods or services since
the 1970's.95 However, the Holder Rule does not apply to contracts
for the sale of real property,96 and the holder in due course doctrine is
alive and well in consumer mortgage transactions.97
Historically, the borrower's ability to repay the loan was the
most important variable in the lender's decision to write a mortgage.
Securitization changes this equation. Today, there is no longer one
"lender" who faces the full panoply of risks associated with the
making of a mortgage loan. Instead, to facilitate securitization, the
mortgage lending process is segmented among multiple actors with
different financial interests. Securitization partitions the risks of the
deal among these different actors and removes any market-based
incentives to protect consumer borrowers against predatory lending.98
When mortgages are securitized, the originator of the mortgage
can profit whether or not the borrower ultimately repays the loan.
described as facilitating "the flow of capital from large lenders to the seller to an
individual consumer.")
93. Professors White and Summers agree. "[W]e believe that on balance the world is
better off with abolition of the holder in due course doctrine in consumer transactions."
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 84, at 534-35.
94. FTC Holder In Due Course Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2008). The regulation
does not directly affect the U.C.C. or state law provisions adopting the holder in due
course doctrine. Instead, it provides that it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within
§ 5 of the FTC Act for a covered seller to omit a notice that any holder of the contract is
subject to all claims and defenses that the borrower could assert against the seller. Id.
The notice causes any assignee of the instrument to take the instrument subject to all of
the borrower's claims and defenses. See U.C.C. § 3-106(d) (2002).
95. See Eggert, supra note 92, at 426-30; Peterson, supra note 28, at 2237-39; Michael
F. Sturley, The Legal Impact of the Federal Trade Commission's Holder in Due Course
Notice on a Negotiable Instrument: How Clever are the Rascals at the FTC?, 68 N.C. L.
REV. 953, 953-60 (1990).
96. The Holder Rule may, however, apply to home repair contracts secured by real
property. See Assoc. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 534 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001); Mitchell v. Church, No. 04L-10-042, 2006 WL 2194738, at *1 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2006).
97. Professor Kurt Eggert persuasively argues that securitization has taken the place
of the holder in due course doctrine in facilitating the flow of capital to the consumer
mortgage market. See Eggert, supra note 28, at 607-38. With respect to consumer credit,
this renders the holder in due course doctrine a dangerous relic that promotes predatory
lending practices. Id.
98. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 28, at 2041 (outlining the ways in which
securitization results in negative externalities for borrowers).
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This relaxes the need for the originator to be overly concerned about
default risk or its lending practices. Investors who purchase
mortgage-backed securities retain the risk of borrower default, but
their concerns have been assuaged with assurances including credit-
enhancements, risk grades, and the investor's ability to purchase
investments with specific risk profiles. The holder in due course
doctrine completes the picture by removing any remaining incentive
that investors might have to police abuses in loan origination. As a
result, securitization creates an ideal environment for unscrupulous or
short-sighted mortgage originators to enhance their own profits and
meet the demand for greater numbers of mortgage products by
originating mortgage loans with predatory features.99
C. Legal Protections Against Predatory Lending
The negative effects of securitization on mortgage loan
consumers have not been uniformly addressed at the federal level,
although a relatively small group of federal statutes offers some
protection to consumers. Many states, including North Carolina,
have found federal efforts inadequate and have implemented their
own statutory solutions to the problem of predatory lending."° The
North Carolina General Assembly has been in the vanguard of this
trend and has supplemented existing common law remedies by
adopting a progressive package of statutes that offer a clear statement
of the legislature's intent to protect consumer borrowers against
mortgage lending abuses.1"'
1. Protections Provided by Federal Law
In contrast to North Carolina's efforts on the state level, there is
no comprehensive federal response to the problem of predatory
lending. 02  Instead, a disparate group of federal statutes and
regulations address specific aspects of lender behavior, but offer only
limited protection to consumer mortgage borrowers. Federal laws
99. See Eggert, supra note 28; Engel & McCoy, supra note 28, at 2049; Peterson, supra
note 28, at 2237-39.
100. As of August 23, 2008, 36 states-including North Carolina-had passed laws to
address predatory mortgage lending practices. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures,
Subprime and Predatory Mortgage Lending: Current State Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/banking/predlend-intro.htm (last visited August 23, 2008).
101. See infra notes 318, 332-34 and accompanying text.
102. See Azmy, supra note 5, at 345 (characterizing federal remedies as "an ineffective
patchwork"); see also Peterson, supra note 28, at 2236-46.
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that directly or indirectly impact predatory lending'013 include the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 ("HOEPA"),' °
the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 0 5 and the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA").
10 6
HOEPA exists as a series of amendments to the Truth in
Lending Act and is implemented by TILA's Regulation Z.07
Although HOEPA is specifically targeted at predatory lending
practices,' °8 the narrow scope of its coverage limits its usefulness.
HOEPA does not apply to many of the most common types of
mortgages, including purchase money mortgages,t1 9  reverse
mortgages, " ° and open-end credit lines. These exclusions make it
easy for lenders to avoid HOEPA by structuring loan transactions to
fall outside its coverage.1"' Beyond this, HOEPA applies only to
"high cost" mortgage loans that meet one of two triggers based on the
interest rate associated with the loan or points and fees charged to the
borrower.'12 For mortgages that fall within its coverage, HOEPA
103. Numerous other federal laws also impact lending practices. See, e.g., the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000), and the Fair Housing Act
("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2000) (both prohibiting discriminatory behavior by
mortgage lenders); see also the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2000)
(prohibiting unfair or deceptive trade practices). ECOA and the FHA can be used to seek
relief for predatory lending practices arising from discriminatory marketing of subprime
loans. For example, in early 2008, the City of Baltimore sued subprime lender Wells
Fargo under the FHA, alleging that Wells Fargo's practice of "reverse redlining" minority
neighborhoods discriminated against African-American borrowers and led to an upsurge
of foreclosures that reduced city tax revenues and increased city expenses. See Ian
Urbina, Foreclosures Prompt Cities to Make Plea for U.S. Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008,
at A15.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000).
105. §§ 1601-67(f).
106. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2000).
107. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2008).
108. Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate Remedial
Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 112-13 (2002).
109. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(w) & (aa)(1).
110. A reverse mortgage allows a homeowner to borrow against the existing equity in
her home. The lender makes payments to the borrower over the life of the reverse
mortgage, then recovers the principal and interest from the future sale of the home. See,
e.g., U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., How HUD's Reverse Mortgage Program Works,
http://www.hud.gov/buying/reverse.cfm (last visited Aug. 23, 2008).
111. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 33, at 1307-08 (discussing the ease with
which lenders can evade HOEPA).
112. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(aa)(1)-(4); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(a)(1), (b)(1). The annual
percentage rate on the loan must exceed the yield on comparable Treasury securities by
8% for first-lien loans or 10% for subordinate-lien loans. Alternatively, the total points
and fees must exceed 8% of the amount borrowed or $400.
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requires a set of disclosures three days before the loan closing"1 3 and
prohibits certain abusive loan practices."
4
RESPA and TILA are disclosure statutes that require lenders to
provide consumer borrowers with basic financial information about
the terms and costs of the loan. RESPA requires the lender and
mortgage broker to provide the borrower with a good faith estimate
of closing costs within three business days after the borrower applies
for the loan."5 RESPA also requires the lender to provide the
borrower with a HUD-1 settlement statement detailing the
borrower's actual closing costs." 6  TILA requires the lender to
provide a disclosure statement providing price information on the
loan including the annual percentage rate, total finance charges, and
the total of payments. 7 Although these statutes do not directly deter
predatory lending, they may have the secondary effect of protecting
knowledgeable borrowers against predatory loan terms. 8
2. Protections Provided by North Carolina Law
a. North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law
In 1999, a coalition of diverse interest groups in North Carolina,
including the North Carolina Bankers Association, the North
Carolina Attorney General's Office, and the Coalition for
113. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1639(a)-(b). The creditor must provide the following
disclosures in conspicuous type size: "You are not required to complete this agreement
merely because you have received these disclosures or have signed a loan application" and
If you obtain this loan, the lender will have a mortgage on your home. You could lose
your home, and any money you have put into it, if you do not meet your obligations under
the loan." The creditor must also disclose,
in the case of a credit transaction with a fixed rate of interest, the annual
percentage rate and the amount of the regular monthly payment; or in the case of
any other credit transaction, the annual percentage rate of the loan, the amount of
the regular monthly payment, a statement that the interest rate and monthly
payment may increase, and the amount of the maximum monthly payment, based
on the maximum interest rate allowed.
Id. §§ 1639(a)(1)(A)-(B), (2)(A)-(B).
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(d), 226.34(a)(1). The substantive
protections provided by HOEPA include a requirement that loans must amortize, a
prohibition on certain penalty interest rate increases, and a prohibition on balloon
payments on loans with terms in excess of five years. For a discussion of the protections
provided by HOEPA, see Peterson, supra note 28, at 2227-28.
115. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2603-04; 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7.
116. 12 U.S.C. § 2603(a); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.8(a).
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-32.
118. For a discussion of the limits of RESPA and TILA, see Engel & McCoy, supra
note 33, at 1268-70.
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Responsible Lending'19 developed the first state law specifically
designed to combat predatory lending practices. When North
Carolina's law was adopted, there was broad agreement that the
number of home loans with predatory features was rapidly increasing
and that existing state and federal remedies would not deter these
practices.2 0 This consensus resulted in strong legislative support for
the passage of the predatory lending bill in both houses of the North
Carolina General Assembly.'
12
The resulting law was based on HOEPA, but added three
important protections to all home loans made in North Carolina 22 by
prohibiting prepayment penalties for any home loan of $150,000 or
less, 23 the practice of loan flipping'2 4 and the financing of single-
premium credit insurance.2 5  The legislation also improved on the
protection HOEPA offered; it defined a broader category of "high-
cost home loans" and added tighter restrictions on the terms of such
loans. 26 The statutory thresholds for a high-cost home loan include
high points and fees, a high interest rate, or certain prepayment
119. Other interest groups involved in this discussion included the North Carolina
Mortgage Bankers Association, the North Carolina Credit Union Network, the North
Carolina Association of Financial Institutions, and the North Carolina Association of
Mortgage Professionals. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending, North Carolina Predatory
Mortgage Lending Law: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.responsiblelending.org/
policy/state/north-carolina/NCfaqs.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2008); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER,
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, U.S. SENATE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND
STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 63-66
(2004).
120. See Richard R. Daugherty, Will North Carolina's Predatory Home Lending Act
Protect Borrowers From the Vulnerability Caused by the Inadequacy of Federal Law?, 4
N.C. BANKING INST. 569, 569-77 (2000).
121. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
122. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1.1A(b)(1), 24-10.2(c) (2007). These provisions apply
to any loan, regardless of cost, in which: (i) the borrower is a natural person, (ii) the debt
is incurred by the borrower primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and (iii)




126. For purposes of North Carolina law, a high-cost home loan is defined as a loan
other than a reverse mortgage in which: (i) the principal amount of the loan is the lesser
of $300,000 or the conforming loan size limit for a single-family dwelling as established by
the Federal National Mortgage Association (also known as Fannie Mae), (ii) the borrower
is a natural person, (iii) the debt is incurred primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes, (iv) the debt is secured by a security interest, mortgage, or deed of trust on the
borrower's principal dwelling, and (v) the terms of the loan meet one of three statutory
thresholds. § 24-1.1E(a)(4).
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penalties."7 If a home loan qualifies as a high-cost home loan under
North Carolina law, the statute imposes limitations on the terms of
the loan and prohibits certain "acts and practices" by the lender.
Limitations on loan terms include prohibitions on discretionary call
provisions,128 balloon payments, negative amortization, increased
interest rates on default, advance payments, 129 and modification or
deferral fees. 3 '
The restrictions on "acts and practices" bar any lender from
making a high-cost home loan unless the borrower receives
counseling on the advisability of the loan and its terms, and the lender
reasonably believes that the borrower will be able to repay the loan. 3'
This section also prohibits the lender from financing certain fees,
points, and charges, prohibits charging points and fees to refinance an
existing high-cost loan with a new high-cost loan, restricts the lender's
payment of loan proceeds under home improvement contracts, and
prohibits the lender from shifting liability to the closing agent or
closing attorney.
13 2
Because North Carolina's predatory lending law was the first in
the nation, its impact on lending practices in North Carolina has been
the subject of several empirical studies.'33 These studies consistently
found that North Carolina experienced an overall decline in subprime
127. The high-cost loan threshold based on points and fees is met if more than 5% of
the loan amount is charged in upfront points, fees, or other charges, exclusive of allowable
charges. § 24-1.1E(a)(6)b. The 5% threshold for fees and points applies to loans of
$20,000 or more. If the loan is less than $20,000, the threshold is met if fees and points
exceed the lesser of 8% of the loan amount or $1000. Id. Alternatively, the threshold is
met if the annual percentage rate of the loan is such that the loan is considered a mortgage
under § 152 of HOEPA and regulations adopted pursuant to HOEPA. § 24-1.1E(a)(6)a.
Finally, the high-cost loan threshold is met if the borrower is charged a prepayment
penalty longer than thirty months or more than 2% of the amount repaid. § 24-
1.1E(a)(6)c.
128. The lender may not, in its sole discretion, accelerate the loan. This provision does
not apply when acceleration of the loan is triggered by borrower default, a due-on-sale
provision, or pursuant to some other provision of the loan unrelated to the payment
schedule. § 24-1.1E(b)(1).
129. The lender may not include terms under which more than two period payments
are required to be consolidated and paid in advance from the proceeds of the loan. § 24-
1.1E(b)(5).
130. § 24-1.1E(b).
131. §§ 24-1.1E(c)(1), (2).
132. §§ 24-1.1E(c)(3)-(6).
133. See, e.g., Gregory Elliehausen & Michael E. Staten, Regulation of Subprime
Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL
EST. FIN. & ECON. 411 (2004); Keith D. Harvey & Peter J. Nigro, Do Predatory Lending
Laws Influence Mortgage Lending? An Analysis of the North Carolina Predatory Lending
Law, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 435 (2004); Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note 46.
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lending activity relative to other southeastern states after the
implementation of the new law."M These findings raised concern that
the law was having a negative effect by obstructing the flow of
legitimate subprime loans to potential borrowers with poor credit.
135
However, a leading study produced in 2004 found that the decline in
subprime loans did not represent a decline in purchase money credit,
but rather was attributable only to a dramatic decline in the number
of subprime refinancing loans. 13 6 Because much predatory subprime
lending occurs in the context of refinancing, the researchers
concluded that North Carolina's predatory lending law was having
the positive effect the legislature intended.'37
This assessment is circumstantially supported by North
Carolina's relatively low foreclosure rate during the national
foreclosure crisis experienced in 2007 and 2008. Although North
Carolina's rate of foreclosure was 9.4% higher in 2007 than in 2006,138
this increase was much lower than the increase experienced in other
areas of the United States during the same period.13 9 In early 2008,
the Office of the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks reported
that North Carolina was well below the national averages for
nontraditional mortgages, adjustable rate loans, subprime loans, and
mortgage fraud. 140  These facts support the inference that North
134. In one sample, North Carolina exhibited a 3% decline in subprime loan
originations in the seven quarters immediately following July 1, 2000. See Quercia,
Stegman & Davis, supra note 46, at 586. During the same period, the nation as a whole
experienced a 17% increase in subprime lending, and the South experienced an 18%
increase. Id.
135. See Elliehausen & Staten, supra note 133, at 429-30; Harvey & Nigro, supra note
133, at 453.
136. Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note 46, at 584. The study compared loans
made for owner-occupied homes during the seven quarters preceding the effective date of
the predatory lending law with comparable loans made during the seven quarters after this
date. During the comparison period, the number of subprime purchase money
originations actually grew from 4,429 to 7,612, an increase of 72.9%. This increase was
offset by a 20.3% decline in the number of subprime refinancing loans, from 19,551 to
15,575. Id. at 584, 587.
137. Id. at 587-88.
138. DEPUTY COMM'R OF H. SELECT COMM., 110TH CONG., RISING FORECLOSURES
IN NORTH CAROLINA 7 (Jan. 23, 2008), http://www.nccob.orgNR/rdonlyres/63F9E8B2-
3FB4-4693-80BE-EC2931F6E700/0/HouseForeclosureCommitteeJanuary2008.pdf.
139. Nationally, 2.2 million foreclosures were filed in 2007, a 75% increase over 2006.
Dudley Price & Paulette Stiles, Townhouses' Financing Fiasco Saps Savings, Shreds
Hopes, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 13, 2008, at Al (citing statistics
compiled by RealtyTrac); see also Jesse McKinley, From Housing Haven to Foreclosure
Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2007, at A13.
140. See H. SELECT COMM., supra note 138, at 5.
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Carolina's strong predatory lending laws have protected the state's
borrowers from the worst effects of the subprime lending crisis.
b. North Carolina's Mortgage Lending Act
In 2001, the North Carolina General Assembly passed the
Mortgage Lending Act'41 intended to bolster the state's predatory
lending law by regulating the conduct of mortgage professionals in
the state. The act imposes licensing requirements on mortgage
bankers, mortgage brokers, and loan officers,4  specifies
qualifications for licensure, 14 and allows the imposition of continuing
education requirements as a condition of license renewal.
145
In an important innovation, the new law imposed a set of
affirmative duties on mortgage brokers, including the duty to
safeguard and account for money handled for the borrower, to "[a]ct
with reasonable skill, care, and diligence," and to make efforts to
provide a loan that is "reasonably advantageous to the borrower,...
including the rates, charges, and prepayment terms of the loan." 146
These duties are in addition to existing duties other statutes or
common law also impose on mortgage brokers.
Finally, the Mortgage Lending Act makes it unlawful for any
person to make or broker a mortgage loan in violation of the
Predatory Lending Act. 147  The North Carolina Commissioner of
Banks is given disciplinary authority over individual mortgage
professionals, such as authority to suspend or revoke licenses and
impose civil penalties against any person, including a licensed
mortgage professional, who violates the provisions of the act. 48
c. Other Protections Provided by North Carolina Law
North Carolina's predatory lending statutes are specifically and
exclusively aimed at curbing abusive mortgage lending practices.
These laws supplement a range of common law and statutory
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-243.01 to .18 (2007), amended by Act of Aug. 17, 2008, ch.
228, sec. 1-14, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws.
142. See Caroline V. Barbee, Note, North Carolina's Mortgage Lending Act: Licensing
and Regulation of Mortgage Bankers and Brokers, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 263, 263 (2003);
see also CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES
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remedies that are generically available to any consumer borrower
injured by unfair lending practices, including North Carolina's
powerful unfair and deceptive trade practices statute, 49 common law
fraud, 5° civil conspiracy,'51 usury, 152 "unjust enrichment, 1 53 "breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing,"'54 and the argument that
discrete loan terms are unconscionable.'55
Finally, although predatory lending practices are associated with
the origination of the loan, the consumer's involvement with the loan
does not end at this point, and North Carolina borrowers have also
sought relief for abusive actions by the servicer of the loan. For
example, in Williams v. HomEq Servicing Corp.,56 the borrowers
sued the loan servicer for negligent infliction of emotional distress, as
well as for violations of North Carolina's unfair debt collection
practices statute 57  and violations of the state laws regulating
collection agencies.'58 Another case, In re Bigelow,'59 illustrates that a
149. § 75-1.1. Relief under this statute is sought in nearly every predatory lending case
brought in North Carolina. See, e.g., Shepard v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 361 N.C. 137,
138, 638 S.E.2d 197, 198 (2006); Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 116, 638 S.E.2d
203, 206 (2006); Richardson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 182 N.C. App. 531, 535, 643 S.E.2d 410,
413 (2007); Melton v. Family First Mortgage Corp., 156 N.C. App. 129, 132, 576 S.E. 2d
365, 368 (2003).
150. See Melton, 156 N.C. App. at 132, 576 S.E.2d at 368.
151. See id.
152. See Shepard, 361 N.C. at 138, 638 S.E.2d at 198; Skinner, 361 N.C. at 116, 638
S.E.2d at 206. But see Citibank, S.D., N.A. v. Palma, 184 N.C. App. 504, 506, 646 S.E.2d
635, 637 (2007) (holding that actions against national banks for usury are preempted by
the National Bank Act). Palma follows in the footsteps of two recent decisions from the
Supreme Court of the United States upholding the preemptive effect of regulations
promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency under the National Bank
Act. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (holding that National
Bank Act provides the exclusive cause of action for usury actions against national banks);
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1564-65 (2007) (holding that a mortgage
lending subsidiary of a national bank is not subject to state regulation).
153. Richardson, 182 N.C. App. at 535, 643 S.E.2d at 413.
154. Id.
155. See Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93, 103, 655 S.E.2d 362,
370 (2008).
156. 184 N.C. App. 413, 646 S.E.2d 381 (2007).
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-50 to -56 (2007). In a case of first impression under North
Carolina law, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs stated a claim for relief under
section 75-52(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes, which prohibits a debt collector
from "[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation with
such frequency as to be unreasonable or to constitute a harassment." Williams, 184 N.C.
App. at 422, 646 S.E.2d at 386. In Williams, the servicer's own records established that the
plaintiffs were called on at least 2200 occasions. Id. The plaintiffs did not prevail on any
other cause of action. Id.
158. §§ 58-70-1 to -130.
159. 185 N.C. App. 142, 649 S.E.2d 10 (2007).
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sufficiently gross servicer error may effectively provide the borrower
with a defense to foreclosure.1" In Bigelow, the court of appeals
barred a foreclosure when the borrower's "default" was caused by the
servicer's wrongful refusal to accept tendered payments.
16 1
II. RECENT DECISIONS FROM NORTH CAROLINA'S APPELLATE
COURTS
The widespread securitization of consumer mortgages has
resulted in a horizontally-segmented lending process in which
responsibility for funding, originating, servicing, and holding the
underlying loans is divided among legally unrelated business entities.
As outlined in Part I, this financing structure creates incentives for
mortgage originators to engage in predatory lending practices while
simultaneously making it more difficult for injured borrowers to
locate responsible parties and hold them liable.
Against this background, the North Carolina courts have
recently reached five decisions affecting the ability of borrowers to
challenge predatory mortgage lending practices. In the first decision,
Melton, the court found against the borrowers, but on grounds that
were entirely consistent with North Carolina law. The following two
decisions, Shepard and Skinner, reached problematic outcomes that
exacerbated the difficulties that borrowers face when attempting to
sue their lenders or the assignees holding their mortgages. Finally,
the two most recent cases, Richardson and Tillman, reversed this
trend and better reflected the changes in consumer mortgage lending
that securitization created.
A. Melton: Assignee Liability
As a general rule, the assignee of a contract stands in the place of
the assignor under North Carolina law.162 The holder in due course
160. This is significant because North Carolina is not a judicial foreclosure state and
permits few defenses to foreclosure. Instead, foreclosure typically proceeds under a power
of sale clause in a deed of trust that inexorably allows foreclosure upon the servicer's
showing of: (1) a valid debt, (2) default, (3) the right to foreclose under the instrument,
and (4) notice. § 45-21.16(d). This statute was amended in August 2008 to add additional
notice requirement for subprime loans made after December 31, 2004 and before
December 31, 2007. Act of Aug. 17, 2008, ch. 226, sec. 3, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws -. If the
elements of section 45-21.16(d) are satisfied, the mortgagor has no equitable defenses to
foreclosure. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure of Azalea Garden Bd. & Care, Inc., 140 N.C. App.
45, 50, 535 S.E.2d 388, 392 (2000).
161. Bigelow, 185 N.C. App. at 147, 649 S.E.2d at 14.




doctrine creates an exception to this general rule, shielding the
assignee of a negotiable instrument from most claims and defenses to
payment that a borrower could assert against the original lender,
provided the assignee did not have knowledge of the claims and
defenses at the time of the transfer of the instrument. 63 Because
mortgage notes are negotiable instruments, the holder in due course
doctrine shields the assignee of a mortgage from liability incurred by
the originator of the note unless some other law negates this
defense.' 6
North Carolina's predatory lending law imposes no liability on
assignees of mortgage loans and, thus, does not change the holder in
due course doctrine. 65 Absent such a provision in the predatory
lending statutes, the most comprehensive and effective cause of
action against assignees under North Carolina law would be the
recognition of assignee liability under North Carolina's Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("UDTPA"). 6 6 However, this theory
of relief was expressly rejected by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in Melton v. Family First Mortgage Corporation.167
In Melton, the plaintiff alleged that her adult granddaughter
drugged her, took control of her finances, and then defrauded her.
68
The plaintiff claimed that, as part of the scheme, her granddaughter
completed an application for a $50,000 mortgage on her home
without her knowledge, and that the lender, Family First, accepted
the loan application with a forged signature and closed the loan
without having previously met with the plaintiff.'69 Family First then
immediately assigned the mortgage to a second entity, Flagstar 7 °
Among sundry other causes of action, the plaintiff included a
claim against the assignee Flagstar seeking relief for unfair and
163. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-305(b) (2007); supra notes 89-92 and accompanying
text.
164. For example, federal law creates a partial solution to this problem by removing
the holder in due course defense for high-cost mortgages subject to HOEPA. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1641(d)(1) (2000). However, this provision does not create an independent cause of
action and applies only if a plaintiff can assert a claim under some other law. See Dash v.
FirstPlus Home Loan Trust 1996-2, 248 F. Supp. 2d 489, 506 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
165. The Predatory Lending Law applies only to the "making" of the loan. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1.1E(d), 24-10.2(e).
166. § 75-1.1.
167. 156 N.C. App. 129, 576 S.E.2d 365 (2003), affid per curiam, 357 N.C. 573, 597
S.E.2d 672 (2003).
168. Melton, 156 N.C. App. at 131,576 S.E.2d at 367-68.
169. id. at 131-32, 576 S.E.2d at 369.
170. Id. at 131, 576 S.E.2d at 367.
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deceptive trade practices under North Carolina law.'71 The court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal of this claim, finding that "Flagstar had
no dealings with the plaintiff in connection with the execution of the
mortgage" and, in fact, no relationship with the plaintiff until after
the plaintiff's execution of the mortgage.'72 In addition, no evidence
suggested that "Family First was acting as an agent for Flagstar" when
it made the mortgage or that Flagstar itself had committed any
improprieties in the execution of the mortgage.'73
Melton states the rule that liability for an unfair or deceptive
trade practice is limited to the party that commits the unfair act, and
stands for the corollary proposition that the assignee of a fraudulent
mortgage is not liable under North Carolina law for an unfair or
deceptive trade practice committed by the originator of the
mortgage. 174  Thus, Melton adheres to the holder in due course
doctrine and refuses to create an exception for conduct that amounts
to an unfair and deceptive trade practice under state law. Given the
ephemeral nature of mortgage originators and the nearly universal
assignment of consumer mortgages, this holding has a significant
impact on the rights of consumer borrowers in North Carolina.
B. Shepard: Accrual of the Plaintiffs Cause of Action
Excessive and unnecessary fees, charges, and insurance
premiums are ubiquitous features of predatory loans. Because the
borrowers targeted for predatory loans rarely have cash to pay these
charges when the loan is made, they commonly finance the
unwarranted fees along with the principal of the loan. 7' When this
occurs, a portion of any usurious fee is paid by the borrower with
every monthly payment, raising an argument that the illegal fees are a
continuing violation for purposes of the statute of limitations.
171. The plaintiff's other claims included common law fraud and civil conspiracy. Id. at
132, 576 S.E.2d at 368.
172. Id. at 133, 576 S.E.2d at 369.
173. Id.
174. This rule has been followed to relieve assignees from liability in at least four
subsequent decisions from North Carolina's state and federal courts. See Dash v. FirstPlus
Home Loan Trust 1996-2, 248 F. Supp. 2d 489, 503 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Lee v. Southstar
Funding, LLC (In re Lee), Ch. 13 Case No. 06-31070, Adv. No. 06-03266 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 2007) (PACER); Tetterton v. Ocwen Fed. Bank (In re Tetterton), 379 B.R. 595,
600 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007); Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 172 N.C. App. 407, 415-16, 616
S.E.2d 676, 681 (2005), aff d on other grounds, 361 N.C. 14, 638 S.E.2d 203 (2006).
175. This, of course, increases the potential profit to the lender because interest is
charged on the excessive fee.
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A sharply divided Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected this
argument in December of 2006 in Shepard v. Ocwen Federal Bank,
FSB.176 The plaintiffs in Shepard obtained a second mortgage in the
amount of $16,500 on July 25, 1997'17 from Chase Mortgage Brokers.
The $16,500 principal amount of the loan included Chase's loan
origination fee of $1,485, roughly 9% of the loan. 17 Chase deducted
and retained its origination fee before disbursing net loan proceeds of
$15,015 to the plaintiffs. 179 Chase then assigned the $16,500 loan to
Ocwen Federal Bank, and Ocwen "assigned the loan to Wells Fargo
Bank Minnesota."180
North Carolina law limits the origination fee that can be charged
for most secondary real property loans to a maximum of 2% of the
principal amount of the loan, 8' but also imposes a two-year statute of
limitations on claims for usury. 2 The plaintiffs did not file suit until
May 3, 2002, nearly five years after the closing of their loan, at which
point they brought claims for usury and unfair and deceptive trade
practices.8 3 The defendants responded by filing a motion to
dismiss,1"4 asserting that the statute of limitations on usury claims, as
well as North Carolina's four-year statute of limitations on claims for
unfair and deceptive trade practices, barred the complaint.185
Because the usurious fee had been rolled into the loan and
financed, the plaintiffs countered that they faced an ongoing violation
of the law because they continued to pay part of the fee every time
they made a payment on the loan. 86 Based on this argument, they
sought recovery of the portion of the usurious fee paid within two
years before the filing of their complaint, as well as any amounts paid
after the complaint was filed. 87
176. 361 N.C. 137, 638 S.E.2d 197 (2006). The majority opinion in Shepard was written
by Justice Brady.
177. Id. at 138, 638 S.E.2d at 198. Like the note and deed of trust in Melton, the
transaction in Shepard predates North Carolina's predatory lending law.
178. Id.
179. Both the $1,485 origination fee and the $15,015 net proceeds were financed as part
of the $16,500 mortgage loan. Id. at 142, 638 S.E.2d at 200 (Timmons-Goodson, J.,
dissenting).
180. Id. at 138, 638 S.E.2d at 198. The plaintiffs in Shepard sued Ocwen and Wells
Fargo, as well as the trustee of the original deed of trust. Id.
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-14(f) (2007).
182. §§ 1-53(2), (3).
183. Shepard, 361 N.C. at 138, 638 S.E.2d at 198.
184. Id. at 139, 638 S.E.2d at 198.
185. § 75-16.2.
186. Shepard, 361 N.C. at 140,638 S.E.2d at 199.
187. Id.
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Four of the seven justices on the Supreme Court of North
Carolina rejected this argument, finding that the plaintiffs' claim
accrued on the date of the loan closing. The majority opinion found
that the origination fee, although usurious, was " 'fully earned' when
the loan was made" and was "charged, paid and received at closing as
a prerequisite for obtaining the loan."' 88 The court found that the
manner in which the origination fee was paid was simply irrelevant to
the extension of the statute of limitations.'89 Because no usurious fees
had been "charged or paid" since closing, the plaintiffs' claims were
time barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to usury
claims and the four-year statute applicable to unfair and deceptive
trade practices claims. 9°
The majority opinion provoked a strong dissent from the
remaining three justices on the court. The key to the disagreement
between the majority and dissenting positions in Shepard is the
majority's statement that the "origination fee was not added to the
loan amount."'' As the dissent notes, the origination fee was
included in the $16,500 amount financed by the plaintiffs."9 As a
result, the plaintiffs were contractually obligated to repay a portion of
the origination fee every month and the inclusion of the usurious fee
in the amount financed increased the amount of their monthly
payments.'93 Thus, the majority's finding that the origination fee was
not added to the loan amount is correct only if the term "loan
amount" refers to the $15,015 disbursed to the plaintiffs and not to
the $16,500 principal amount of the loan.
19 4
The majority's inaccurate characterization of the loan allowed it
to ignore the economic reality of the transaction. Although the
origination fee was paid to the lender at closing, it was not paid by the
borrower at that point.'95 In reality, the origination fee was being
188. Id. The majority opinion relied on an unpublished decision from the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Faircloth v. Fin. Asset Sec. Corp. Mego Mortgage Homeowner
Loan Trust, 87 F. App'x. 314 (4th Cir. 2004) (unpublished).
189. Shepard, 361 N.C. at 140, 638 S.E.2d at 199.
190. Id. at 141, 638 S.E.2d at 200.
191. Id. at 140, 638 S.E.2d at 199.
192. Id. at 142, 638 S.E.2d at 200 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 143, 638 S.E.2d at 201 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting). The dissent
points out that if the plaintiffs had been charged a non-usurious origination fee of 2%,
their monthly payment would have been $203.86-not the monthly payment of $219.63
that they were actually paying. Id.
194. The statute itself uses the term "principal amount of the loan," which would be
$16,500 in the Shepards' loan. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-14(f) (2007).
195. Justice Timmons-Goodson notes that the Internal Revenue Service recognizes
that home mortgage fees that are financed are not paid by the borrower at closing, with
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repaid in the borrower's continuing monthly payments, and each of
these payments was higher than the amount allowed by North
Carolina law. Viewed in these purely financial terms, the court's
holding that the ongoing payment of the illegal fee was not a
continuing violation of the statute does not withstand analysis.'96
C. Skinner: Lack of Personal Jurisdiction over the Holder
When different facets of mortgage transactions are fragmented
during securitization, portions of the transaction may be isolated in
entities whose contacts with North Carolina arise only through the
mortgages themselves. In addition, the holder of the securitized
mortgage itself will be an SPV, typically a trust that has been
specifically designed to avoid operational liability. Although this
holder is the beneficial owner of the mortgage, its inherently passive
nature allows it to argue that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction
outside its state of organization.
In Skinner v. Preferred Credit,'97 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina concluded that the North Carolina courts lacked personal
jurisdiction over a New York trust that was just such a defendant,
even though the trust held the beneficial interest in 114 mortgages
made with North Carolina citizens and secured by real property in
North Carolina.'98 The passivity of the defendant trust was the crucial
factor in this decision. 99
The Skinners obtained a $45,000 second mortgage from
Preferred Credit on January 22, 1997.200 The fees and costs charged
to the plaintiffs at closing totaled $5,225.70, which included an
unlawfully high origination fee of $3,600.20' After closing, their loan
was sold to Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corporation, which ultimately assigned all rights under the loan to
the result that they cannot be deducted as mortgage interest in the year the loan is made.
Shepard, 361 N.C. at 144, 638 S.E.2d at 201.
196. The Supreme Court of North Carolina's holding in Shepard was legislatively
overruled by the North Carolina General Assembly in July of 2007. See infra note 333 and
accompanying text.
197. 361 N.C. 114, 638 S.E.2d 203 (2006), reh'g denied, 361 N.C. 371, 638 S.E.2d 591
(2007).
198. Skinner, 631 N.C. at 119-20, 638 S.E.2d at 208-09.
199. Id. at 124, 638 S.E.2d at 211 ("Our cases analyzing minimum contacts rarely have
dealt with so 'passive' a defendant.").
200. Id. at 116, 638 S.E.2d at 207.
201. Id. The origination fee was 8% of the amount financed, and the total fees and
charges amounted to 11.6% of the loan. Id. The annual percentage rate on the Skinners'
loan was 16.902%. Id.
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the "1997-1 Trust,, 2 2 a trust formed by Credit Suisse to facilitate
securitization of the loan pool that included the Skinners' loan.20 3
Pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement forming the 1997-1
Trust, its purpose was "to hold mortgage loans ... , receive income
from the mortgage loans ... , distribute payments received from the
Servicer . .. , and issue certificates [to investors]. ' 2 4 Outside these
limited functions, the trust was inert. It had no employees, did not
engage in any business, made no contracts, did not solicit mortgage
loans, and did not directly collect payments from borrowers.0 5
Instead, as is typical of securitized loans, all direct interaction with the
borrowers was performed by a separate servicer.20 6
The plaintiffs initially sued twenty defendants alleging that
Preferred Credit, the loan originator, had "charged excessive loan
origination fees and usurious interest rates" and that the defendants
had violated the UDTPA.27  "Preferred Credit was never served,"
however, and most of the remaining defendants were dismissed
during the course of the litigation, leaving only the 1997-1 Trust and
its trustee as defendants. 28 On appeal to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, the only issue left for decision was whether the 1997-1 Trust
was subject to personal jurisdiction in the state.
The Skinner decision was issued on the same day as Shepard and
reveals the same 4-3 split among the seven justices. 209 The majority
opinion in Skinner finds that jurisdiction over the out-of-state trust is
not authorized by North Carolina's long-arm statute210 and, in the
alternative, holds that the exercise of jurisdiction over the trust would
violate due process because the trust lacked sufficient contacts with
North Carolina.21'
Although the court analyzed three sections of North Carolina's
long-arm statute,212 its analysis could have ended with its holding that
202. Id. The full name of the 1997-1 Trust was the Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corporation Preferred Credit Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 1997-1. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 116-17, 638 S.E.2d at 207.
205. Id. at 117, 638 S.E.2d at 207.
206. Id. at 117-18, 638 S.E.2d at 207-08.
207. Id. at 118, 638 S.E.2d at 208.
208. Id.
209. The majority opinion in Skinner was written by Justice Newby. As in Shepard,
Justice Timmons-Goodson wrote the dissent and was joined by Justices Martin and
Edmunds.
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (2007).
211. Skinner, 361 N.C. at 126, 638 S.E.2d at 213.
212. Id. at 119-22, 638 S.E.2d at 208-10. The court's analysis addressed sections 1-
75.4(1)(d), (5)(d), and (6)(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes. Id.
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§ 1-75.4(1)(d) did not support jurisdiction over the out-of-state trust.
Section 1-75.4(1)(d) supplies personal jurisdiction over any party
"engaged in substantial activity within this State, whether such
activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise. '213 Because this
section provides North Carolina courts with "the full jurisdictional
powers permissible under federal due process, 2 14 it effectively
collapses the long-arm statute into the due process requirement. In
tacit recognition of this, the court engaged in a sub rosa contacts
analysis while discussing the long-arm statute, finding that this section
does not authorize jurisdiction over the defendant trust because it has
no "activity '215 in North Carolina.
Although this part of the court's holding was sufficient to dispose
of the case, the court proceeded to engage in a separate, and entirely
duplicative, due process analysis, noting and disposing of three
separate North Carolina contacts, while improperly considering each
in isolation.2 16  First, the court considered the origination of the
plaintiff's loan in North Carolina by Preferred Credit.217 Next, the
court discussed the trust's status as the holder of promissory notes
secured by deeds of trust on North Carolina property.218 Finally, the
court addressed the trust's receipt of loan payments made by North
Carolina borrowers.
21 9
The court quickly dispensed with the defendant's first possible
contact, finding the origination of the plaintiffs' loan by another
entity insufficient to support jurisdiction over the later-formed
trust.22° This holding is well-reasoned; however, the court's analysis
falters during its consideration of the remaining two sets of contacts.
Although the trust held 114 promissory notes secured by deeds
of trust on North Carolina property, the court discounted these
contacts because these notes comprised only 3% of the 3,537 loans
213. § 1-75.4(1)(d).
214. Skinner, 361 N.C. at 119, 638 S.E.2d at 208 (citing Dillon v. Numismatic Funding
Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 676, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1977)).
215. Id. The court noted that the 1997-1 Trust was created after the origination of the
plaintiffs' loan and that all of its activities (holding notes, receiving income, and issuing
trust certificates) occurred outside of North Carolina. Id.
216. Id. at 123-24, 638 S.E.2d at 210-13; see also Recent Case, Constitutional Law-
Personal Jurisdiction-North Carolina Supreme Court Finds No Jurisdiction Over New
York Trust-Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 638 S.E.2d 203 (N.C. 2006), reh'g denied, 643
S.E.2d 591 (N.C. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 636, 638 (2007) (noting that the court
improperly considered each contact in isolation).
217. Skinner, 361 N.C. at 123, 638 S.E.2d at 211.
218. Id. at 123-24, 638 S.E.2d at 211.
219. Id. at 124, 638 S.E.2d at 211.
220. Skinner, 361 N.C. at 123, 638 S.E.2d at 211.
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held in the trust's loan pool.22' However, because the plaintiffs had
invoked specific jurisdiction, the percentage of North Carolina loans
held by the defendant was irrelevant.222 Under a specific jurisdiction
analysis, the dispositive question would be whether the defendant
held the one promissory note that gave rise to the plaintiffs' claims.
The court compounded the problem by dismissing the trust's interest
in the plaintiffs' property as "simply a beneficial interest in North
Carolina property." '223 With any deed of trust, legal title to the
plaintiffs' property is held by the trustee under their deed of trust, but
the holder of the beneficial interest is the party that has the right to
receive payments. Thus, the mortgagee/trust possessed a significant
property interest, despite the absence of legal title.
The majority was also unimpressed with the trust's receipt of the
plaintiffs' mortgage payments. Although the court acknowledged the
defendant as the ultimate "depository" of the plaintiffs' payments, it
rejected this fact as unimportant because the payments were not
made directly to the trust, but instead to the servicer. 24 Rather than
recognizing the trust/servicer relationship as a standard financial
conduit involuntarily imposed on the plaintiffs by the securitization of
their mortgage, the court created a jurisdictional "privity"
requirement that allowed the plaintiffs to sue only the entity that
directly received their payments. This holding greatly strengthens the
ability of lenders to use structured finance to shield themselves from
suit.
The dissent in Skinner found that at least two sections of the
North Carolina long-arm statute, including section 1-75.4(1)(d),
would permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the trust.225
The dissenting justices then found that the assertion of jurisdiction
221. Id.
222. The percentage of contacts is relevant only to determine whether the defendant's
contacts with the forum state are sufficiently systematic and continuous to support general
jurisdiction. When, as here, personal jurisdiction is premised on specific jurisdiction, the
plaintiffs need only show that their claim arises directly from the defendant's contact,
however limited, with the forum state. See, e.g., KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 55 (1999).
223. Skinner, 361 N.C. at 123, 638 S.E.2d at 211.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 129, 638 S.E.2d at 214 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting). The second
section, section 1-75.4(6)(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes, provides for personal
jurisdiction "[iun any action which arises out of ... [a] claim to recover for any benefit
derived by the defendant through the use, ownership, control or possession by the
defendant of tangible property situated within this State either at the time of the first use,
ownership, control or possession or at the time the action is commenced." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-75.4(6)(b) (2007).
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over the defendant trust would not violate due process because the
trust's beneficial interest in mortgages made in North Carolina,
specifically including the plaintiffs' mortgage, provide a sufficient
contact to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant trust.226  The dissent's analysis concludes that the
"defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business" with North Carolina residents, giving it every reason to
expect that it might be subjected to litigation in North Carolina. 27
D. Richardson: Unauthorized Sale of Single Premium Credit
Insurance
Since July 1, 2000, North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law has
prohibited the sale of single premium credit insurance on any
mortgage loan originated in North Carolina.228 Credit insurance is
tied to a specific debt and typically pays any outstanding balance in
the event of the borrower's death, disability, or job lOSS. 229  Single
premium credit insurance is widely perceived as abusive because the
premium is paid through one upfront payment at the loan closing and
then financed over the life of the loan.23°
Richardson v. Bank of America231 was a class action brought by
consumer borrowers who were sold single-premium credit insurance
in conjunction with the closing of their mortgage loans.232 When the
plaintiffs' loans were made, North Carolina allowed the sale and
financing of single-premium credit insurance in conjunction with
loans having terms of fifteen years or less, but the Department of
Insurance had not approved the sale of credit insurance on loans
having a longer duration.233 The plaintiff class in Richardson included
226. Id. at 130-36, 638 S.E.2d at 217-19 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 136, 638 S.E.2d at 217 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (citing World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
228. § 24-10.2(b).
229. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: JOINT REPORT 7 (2000), available
at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf.
230. See Azmy, supra note 5, at 342-43 (discussing single premium credit insurance and
noting that it is a marker of predatory lending).
231. 182 N.C. App. 531, 643 S.E.2d 410 (2007), review granted in part by 361 N.C. 569,
650 8.E.2d 439 (2007), and discretionary review improvidently allowed by 362 N.C. 227, 657
S.E.2d 353 (2008).
232. Richardson, 182 N.C. App. at 535, 643 S.E.2d at 413. The borrowers financed the
insurance premiums over the life of their loans, and the amount of the premium was based
upon the amount financed, including any financed origination fees, points, and other
closing costs. Id. at 534-35, 643 S.E.2d at 414.
233. Id.
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a group of borrowers with loan terms greater than fifteen years who
were sold unauthorized credit insurance by their lender.234
A three-judge panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals 35
held that the lender's unlawful sale of single-premium credit
insurance was an unlawful and deceptive trade practice under North
Carolina law, breached the lender's duty of good faith and fair
dealing, and constituted willful and wanton tortious activity sufficient
to support the imposition of punitive damages. Adopting language
from the trial court's opinion, the court found that single-premium
credit insurance is "expensive insurance that meets the needs of very
few if any customers, ' and that the large profit available to the
lender was the "primary motivation" behind its sale of this product.237
Based on these findings, the court of appeals held that the lender
had acted in "conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference
to" 238 the plaintiffs' rights and that they were therefore entitled to
submit their class claim for punitive damages to a jury.239 Finally, the
court agreed with the plaintiffs that the illegal insurance contracts
were void as against public policy. 4° As a result, the credit insurance
provided to the plaintiffs had no intrinsic value and could not be used
to offset the plaintiffs' claims for damages. 41
In Richardson, the court of appeals produced a strong, pro-
consumer holding that stands in marked contrast to the opinions in
Melton, Shepard, and Skinner. Several factors may explain the
difference. First, the conduct in Richardson actively violated North
Carolina insurance law. Insurance is a highly regulated product, and
it is unlawful to sell insurance products in North Carolina that have
not been approved by the state's Commissioner of Insurance.242
234. Id. The class of plaintiffs in Richardson was limited to "North Carolina borrowers
who obtained a loan before July 1, 2000." Id.
235. The opinion was written by Judge McGee and joined by Judges Bryant and
Steelman. The Supreme Court of North Carolina originally granted discretionary review
over the unanimous court of appeals decision pursuant to section 7A-31 of the North
Carolina General Statutes; however, the court later issued a brief per curiam decision,
holding that discretionary review had been improvidently allowed. See Richardson, 361
N.C. 569, 650 S.E.2d 439 (2007) (allowing review); 362 N.C. 227, 657 S.E.2d 353 (2008)
(declining review).
236. Richardson, 182 N.C. App. at 560, 643 S.E.2d at 428.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 558, 643 S.E.2d at 427 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-5(7) (2007)).
239. Id at 559, 643 S.E.2d at 428.
240. Id. at 563, 643 S.E.2d at 430.
241. Id. ("[T]he SPCI sold to Plaintiffs with loans greater than fifteen years in length
did not have any value because the contract was void as against public policy.")
242. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-150(a) (2007).
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North Carolina's insurance laws are express statements of legislative
will and intent that should be enforced by the state's courts. To
enable this enforcement, affected consumers must have the ability to
sue lenders who violate the law.
Second, the sale of single-premium credit insurance was
outlawed by North Carolina General Assembly with the passage of
the 1999 Predatory Lending Law.243 Although the transactions
challenged in Richardson predate the effective date of this law, the
legislature's prohibition of the sale of this product is a clear statement
of public policy that adds additional force to the court's holding.
Finally, it is possible to see the opinion in Richardson as
reflecting a more informed awareness of the changes that widespread
securitization has brought to the consumer mortgage industry.
Although the court did not articulate this factor, the Richardson
court's approach to these issues is far more responsive to the interests
of the consumer plaintiffs than the opinions in Melton, Shepard, and
Skinner. Richardson signals a sea change that continues in Tillman v.
Commercial Credit Loans, Inc.,2  the last opinion in this series of
decisions.
E. Tillman: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
Like Richardson, Tillman was filed as a class action challenging
the sale of single-premium credit insurance in conjunction with the
origination of mortgage loans.245  The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant "Commercial Credit sold them single premium credit
insurance they did not need or want without disclosing such insurance
was optional and that Commercial Credit was the beneficiary of the
policies.2 146  The two named plaintiffs had financed insurance
premiums totaling $2,064 and $4,208, representing 11% and 20% of
each plaintiff's respective amount financed. 47
The real battle in Tillman, however, concerned the enforceability
of an arbitration clause contained in the plaintiffs' loan agreements.
The prominently-placed arbitration clause provided for mandatory
arbitration of all claims arising out of the agreement with two lender-
243. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
244. 362 N.C. 93, 655 S.E.2d 362 (2008), rev'g 177 N.C. App. 568, 629 S.E.2d 865
(2006).
245. Tillman, 362 N.C. at 96-97, 655 S.E.2d at 366-67. Although Tillman was filed as a
class action, there is no indication that the trial court certified the class. Id. at 96 n.1, 655
S.E.2d at 366 n.1.
246. Tillman, 177 N.C. App. at 569, 629 S.E.2d at 868.
247. Tillman, 362 N.C. at 94, 655 S.E.2d at 365.
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friendly exceptions: (1) actions to foreclose the property, and (2) any
matter where all parties in the aggregate seek $15,000 or less,
inclusive of damages, costs, and fees. 248 The arbitration clause also
prohibited class actions, limited the joinder of parties, and included a
provision shifting most arbitration costs to the borrowers.249
The plaintiffs ignored this arbitration clause and filed a civil suit
in North Carolina superior court, prompting the defendants to
respond by filing a motion to compel arbitration."0 The trial court
denied the motion and agreed with the plaintiffs that the arbitration
provision was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.25' A
divided panel of the court of appeals reversed the trial court, finding
the provision enforceable. 52 The plaintiffs then appealed to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, which issued a deeply divided
decision affirming the trial court's holding of unconscionability on
January 25, 2008.
Five justices combined in two separate opinions to find the
arbitration agreement unconscionable. Two justices joined a detailed
opinion written by Justice Timmons-Goodson finding that the
arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.253  Procedural unconscionability is " 'bargaining
naughtiness' in the form of unfair surprise, lack of meaningful choice,
and an inequality of bargaining power. 254  Substantive
unconscionability, on the other hand, "refers to harsh, one-sided, and
oppressive contract terms., 255  Justices Edmunds and Martin
248. Id. at 94-96, 655 S.E.2d at 365-66. The evidence showed that these exceptions had
permitted Citifinancial to file more than 1700 foreclosure actions against North Carolina
borrowers, as well as more than 2000 collections actions with an average amount in
dispute of less than $7,000. Id. at 97, 655 S.E.2d at 367.
249. Empirical evidence established that these procedures were effective in
discouraging arbitration. Although Citifinancial had made more than 68,000 loans to
North Carolinians since adding these provisions to its agreements, no North Carolina
borrower had ever requested arbitration. Id. at 110, 655 S.E.2d at 374-75 (Edmunds, J.,
concurring).
250. Id. at 96-97, 655 S.E.2d at 366-67.
251. Id. at 100, 655 S.E.2d at 368.
252. Tillman, 177 N.C. App 568, 629 S.E.2d 865 (Judge Tyson wrote the majority
opinion and was joined by Judge McCullough while Judge Hunter dissented).
253. Tillman, 362 N.C. at 102, 655 S.E.2d at 370.
254. Id. at 102-03, 655 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting Rite Color Chem. Co. v. Velvet Textile
Co., 105 N.C. App. 14, 20, 411 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1992)). These three justices agreed that
the clause at issue was procedurally unconscionable because the borrowers were rushed
through the loan closings, credit insurance and the arbitration clause were never
mentioned to the borrowers, and because the bargaining power between the parties was
"unquestionably unequal." Id.
255. Id. at 104, 655 S.E.2d at 371. Justice Timmons-Goodson found the arbitration
clause substantively unconscionable because it imposed "prohibitively high" costs on the
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concurred in a separate opinion that unified the procedural and
substantive components of unconscionability into an inquiry into the
totality of the circumstances.5 6 Finally, Justices Newby and Parker
joined in a strong dissent objecting that the plurality was invalidating
the arbitration clause merely "because it is an agreement to
arbitrate.""
The plurality and dissenting opinions in Tillman are premised on
fundamentally different approaches to the problems posed by the
case. Five justices were willing to find a consumer contract provision
contained in a mortgage loan unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable 8.25  The two opinions that form the plurality focus on
the harmful nature of the insurance sold to the plaintiffs, the
plaintiffs' limited financial means, and the fact that the arbitration
clause effectively deprived them of any remedy.259 These five justices
were concerned with "the inequality of the bargain represented by
the arbitration clause," finding this "so manifest as to shock the
judgment of a person of common sense," and "so oppressive that no
reasonable person would offer it on the one hand or accept it on the
other. ',26  They were alert to the fact that the arbitration clause at
borrowers, contained one-sided exceptions that allowed only the lender to sue, and
prohibited joinder of claims and class actions. Id.
256. Id. at 110-11, 655 S.E.2d at 374-75 (Edmunds, J., concurring). The three opinions
in Tillman differ in their interpretation of Brenner v. Little Red School House, Ltd., 302
N.C. 207, 274 S.E.2d 206 (1981), the controlling North Carolina precedent on
unconscionable consumer contracts. Justice Timmons-Goodson applies Brenner to
conclude that the arbitration clause is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
Justice Edmunds' concurrence views Brenner as requiring the court to apply a totality of
the circumstances test. Justice Newby's dissent appears to agree with Timmons-
Goodson's understanding of Brenner, but disagrees with her application of that decision to
these facts. Id. at 118 n.6, 655 S.E.2d at 379 n.6 (Newby, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 112, 655 S.E.2d at 375 (Newby, J., dissenting).
258. This worked a subtle change in North Carolina contract law. As Justice Newby
notes in his dissent, Brenner equated "'bargaining power' with choices in the
marketplace." Id. at 120, 655 S.E.2d at 380 (Newby, J., dissenting). As a result, a contract
of adhesion was not unconscionable in North Carolina, so long as the consumer was free
to reject that contract and seek another option on the market. This aspect of Brenner,
which made it virtually impossible for a consumer contract to be found unconscionable,
was implicitly rejected by the majority in Tillman.
259. Justice Timmons-Goodson noted that the sale of single premium credit insurance
on home mortgages has been outlawed in North Carolina since 2000 and highlighted the
plaintiffs' "limited financial resources." Id. at 94, 655 S.E.2d at 365. She further noted the
unequal bargaining power of the parties and the fact that the arbitration clause "severely
limited plaintiffs' access to the forum of their choice." ld. at 108, 655 S.E.2d at 373. These
themes are echoed by Justice Edmunds, who finds that the arbitration clause "effectively
prevented plaintiffs from vindicating their rights under the contract in any forum." Id. at
110, 655 S.E.2d at 374 (Edmunds, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 110-11, 655 S.E.2d at 375 (Edmunds, J., concurring).
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issue was placed in the context of a consumer mortgage loan
transaction involving a high-cost form of insurance that provided no
value to the borrowers who paid for it.
The dissent was also aware of this context, as indicated by its
initial statement that "[t]his case .. . is not about regulating subprime
loans. '"2 61 Even though the arbitration clauses at issue were placed in
subprime loan documents, in Justice Newby's view, the case was
about the bedrock contract principle that borrowers and lenders alike
should have the freedom to make contracts-even foolish ones.262
More fundamentally, however, the dissent viewed the case as
implicating "the role courts should play in interpreting and enforcing
contracts. 2 63 The dissent's paramount concern was with preventing
judicial intrusion upon the bargain struck by the parties:
We must decide the case ... not by what we may think would
have been a wiser and more discreet contract on the part of the
plaintiff, if he could have procured one, but by what is written
in the contract actually made by them. Courts are not at liberty
to rewrite contracts for the parties. We are not their guardians,
but the interpreters of their words.2"
The dissent in Tillman, like the plurality opinions in Shepard and
Skinner, seems not to consider the drastic changes that securitization
has produced in the mortgage market faced by consumer borrowers
in North Carolina.
On the other hand, the plurality opinions in Tillman resemble
the opinion in Richardson, in that they recognize the nature of the
underlying loan transactions and do not hesitate to intervene within
the bounds of the law. In effect, the Tillman majority is-as feared by
the dissent-willing to regulate subprime loans.
261. Id. at 111, 655 S.E.2d at 375 (Edmunds, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 111, 655 S.E.2d at 375 (Newby, J., dissenting) ("I recognize that ... our
General Assembly decided to outlaw the sale of single premium insurance some time after
the execution of the contracts at issue .. . . [T]he Court's decision today implicates
bedrock principles of contract law which should not be disturbed in response to policy
concerns over a disfavored industry.")
263. Id. at 115, 655 S.E.2d at 377 (Newby, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 116, 655 S.E.2d at 378 (Newby, J., dissenting) (quoting Powers v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 186 N.C. 336, 337, 119 S.E. 481,482 (1923)).
1540 [Vol. 86
PREDA TORY LENDING
III. PASSIVE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE DUTY TO DECIDE
A. Justiciability and Judicial Restraint
Doctrines of justiciability are used to limit the judicial power and
decisional reach of courts.265  Justiciability concepts, including
standing, ripeness, mootness, and the avoidance of advisory opinions,
are used "to identify appropriate occasions for judicial action. "266
Conversely, and more commonly, they are also used to identify
situations in which a court may justifiably refuse to exercise its
decisional power, even over cases that otherwise fall within its
jurisdiction.67 Controversies that are not justiciable are described as
hypothetical, abstract, or moot.26  Justiciable controversies, on the
other hand, are "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests.
269
Justiciability is most frequently an issue when courts are asked to
determine the propriety of legislative or executive action.27 ° This is
because justiciability doctrines are used, in large part, to "define the
role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power" and
to ensure that courts do not "intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government., 271  Justiciability doctrines provide
legitimate limits on judicial power and complement other
fundamental concepts that restrain the exercise of power by courts,
265. Because federal courts are constrained by the "case and controversy" requirement
of Article III of the Constitution, justiciability concerns are more pressing in federal courts
than in state courts. However, state courts, including the North Carolina state courts, also
defer to concepts of justiciability. See generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the
"Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001)
(discussing the functions of justiciability doctrines in state courts).
266. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1146 (6th Cir. 1975). For North
Carolina cases dealing with justiciability issues, see, e.g., In re Peoples, 269 N.C. 109, 250
S.E.2d 890 (1978) ("mootness"); Neuse River Found. Inc., v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 115
N.C. App. 110, 574 S.E.2d 48 (2002) ("standing").
267. Malamud, 521 F.2d at 1146.
268. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529 (2d ed. 1984) and cases cited
therein; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 45 (3rd ed. 1999) ("The
justiciability doctrines define the judicial role; they determine when it is appropriate for
the federal courts to review a matter and when it is necessary to defer to the other
branches of government."); Hershkoff, supra note 265, at 1840 ("In the federal system,
justiciability doctrine defines the work of Article III courts and attempts to mark a
boundary between the worlds of law and politics.").
271. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 270 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)).
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like those embodied in the Eleventh Amendment 272 and the Due
Process Clause. 273
The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, 274 as well as
that of the North Carolina state courts,275 is also constitutionally
controlled. In addition, federal courts have developed abstention
doctrines that allow them to refrain from deciding some cases that
present justiciable controversies over which they have jurisdiction.276
Even when not constitutionally mandated, these limits enforce
important policy concerns and allow federal and state judges to police
the application of their jurisdiction.
Outside these limits, a modern tendency exists to regard judicial
power with suspicion, and the pejorative term "judicial activism" has
been developed to describe judicial behavior that is not sufficiently
restrained.277 However, the most persuasive advocates of judicial
restraint do not focus on judicial activism, but instead examine the
productive and positive uses of prudent judicial inaction. For
example, Alexander Bickel's classic analysis of the "passive virtues"
of judging does not urge the creation of a corps of idle or
unresponsive judges. 8  Instead, he counsels judges to use
justiciability doctrines to avoid deciding issues prematurely or in
advance of legislative action. 9
272. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
273. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(holding the notice statute unconstitutional); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945) (finding sufficient minimum contacts in the state to subject appellant to a
suit in the state).
274. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
275. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12; see also JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA
STATE CONSTITUTION WITH HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 111 (1995) (noting that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina is a constitutional court because its existence derives
from the North Carolina Constitution).
276. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (finding abstention
appropriate where the state provided system of regulation, and federal intervention would
cause undue delay).
277. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial
Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1401-04 (2002); Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and
Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism," 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1442-44 (2004).
278. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) [hereinafter
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH]; Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960
Term: Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). For the classic
contemporaneous criticism of Bickel's work, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
279. THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 278, at 131. To illustrate the
wisdom of this approach, Bickel cites Justice Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting):
PREDATORY LENDING
Thirty-five years after Bickel, Cass Sunstein provided a
thoughtful analysis of the advantages of decisional minimalism, which
he defines as "doing and saying as little as necessary to justify an
outcome."'  In Sunstein's view, the best judges "decide no more
than they have to decide. They leave things open. They make
deliberate decisions about what should be left unsaid.""2  Sunstein's
minimalist judges are not passive. Instead, they use silence
constructively and in a manner that he describes as "democracy-
forcing,"'  meaning not only that they leave issues open for decision
by elected officials, but also that they reach decisions that require
legislatures to "speak with clarity.
2 83
Minimalist judges issue narrow decisions that leave unsettled
issues open for future legislative or judicial action, and use
justiciability doctrines as a means to this end.2' They decide only the
case before them, and they avoid supporting their judgments with
abstract pronouncements of principle.285 They proceed "in a way that
is catalytic rather than preclusive, and that is closely attuned to the
fact that courts are participants in the system of democratic
deliberation. '286  Sunstein's admiration for judicial minimalism is
based, in part, on the principle that elected representatives are more
democratically accountable than judges.287 In his view, judicial
decisions should not foreclose legislative solutions, but instead should
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the
military emergency .... But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to
show that it conforms to the Constitution, .. . the Court for all time has validated
the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting
American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for
the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need .... There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be
in its own image.
Id. Bickel views a bad rule made by the Court as far more dangerous than a bad rule
made by military order. Id.
280. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1995).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 7.
283. Id. at 25.
284. See Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1454, 1458 (2000).
285. Id.
286. Sunstein, supra note 280, at 101.
287. Id. at 19; see infra notes 312-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
political accountability of elected judges.
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encourage, enable, and reinforce lasting solutions that come through
the democratic process. 288
Minimalist opinions also reflect awareness that a court may
decide complex, unsettled issues incorrectly or on the basis of
incomplete information. To guard against these possibilities,
minimalist judicial opinions leave flexibility for future decision-
making. "Minimalists refuse to freeze existing ideals and
conceptions; in this way they retain a good deal of room for future
deliberation and choice." 9  In Sunstein's minimalist model, judges
should be "cautious about imposing their own views on the rest of
society" and respectful of democratically-expressed views embodied
in legislation. 9 °
B. The Duty to Decide
Justiciability doctrines limit the adjudicative responsibilities of
courts, while the ideal of judicial minimalism counsels judges to
exercise restraint in their decisions. The development of these
boundaries around the adjudicative function indicates that judges
may sometimes have a positive duty to decide justiciable issues that
fall within their jurisdiction.291 Minimalism neither describes nor
erodes this duty; it merely adds that judicial decisions should
narrowly address the case before the court and not foreclose future
development of the law through legislative or judicial action.
It is intuitively correct and natural that judges have an
affirmative duty to decide justiciable issues placed before them.
However, it is difficult to locate the exact parameters of any such
duty. 292 The most famous expression of a duty to decide is found in
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cohens v. Virginia: "With
288. Id. Sunstein has been criticized for underestimating the important role of courts
as "the deliberative crucible of principle" in a democratic system of government. See
Peters, supra note 284, at 1466. This assessment oversimplifies Sunstein's approach, which
leaves wide latitude for courts to reach decisions that effect change. See, e.g., Sunstein,
supra note 280, at 71 (seeing Romer v. Evans, 526 U.S. 620 (1996), as a narrowly-decided
minimalist opinion whose value lies, partly, in the change effected by Justice Kennedy's
matter-of-fact treatment of homosexuals as "citizens like everyone else").
289. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 259 (1999).
290. Id. at x.
291. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and
the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L. J. 121, 127 (2005) (noting that "[t]he very existence of
justiciability doctrines, which excuse courts from deciding cases in certain circumstances,
implies that where those circumstances are not present, courts do not enjoy the freedom to
abstain from adjudication.").
292. Id. This problem is the focus of Oldfather's article.
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whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended,
we must decide it, if it be brought before us .... Questions may
occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.
293
Cohens has not led to the development of a judicially-recognized duty
to decide,294 however, and the most thorough analyses of the
adjudicatory responsibilities of judges come from legal scholars-not
from the courts themselves.
Two classic accounts of the American adjudicative process were
produced in the mid-1970s by Lon Fuller and Abram Chayes.2 95 The
traditional private law model of adjudication, as described by Fuller,
views dispute resolution as the primary function of courts, and sees
the prototypical case as a bipolar dispute between private parties. 296
The private law model sees the lawsuit as "a self-contained
episode, ' 297 whose impact is limited to the parties. On the other
hand, Chayes' "public law" model of adjudication focuses on the law-
making function of the courts and views the most important
characteristic of modern litigation as the "vindication of
constitutional or statutory policies.
298
Today, both of these models are considered outdated because
neither adequately captures the full range of roles played by judges in
modern litigation.299  Nevertheless, each continues to accurately
describe certain aspects of the judicial role. As a practical matter,
courts, particularly state trial courts, devote much of their time to
resolving disputes between private parties.3 0  However, private
293. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (affirming the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
over appeals from the highest court of a state).
294. Today, Cohens is used to support a duty to decide only within the context of the
"doctrine of necessity," which obligates an otherwise disqualified judge to decide a case if
all available judges are disqualified. See Oldfather, supra note 291, at 128-29.
295. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978).
296. See Fuller, supra note 295, at 357; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation,
Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV.
410, 424 (1978); Chayes, supra note 295, at 1282 ("In our received tradition, the lawsuit is a
vehicle for settling disputes between private parties about private rights.").
297. Chayes, supra note 295, at 1283.
298. Id. at 1284. Chayes described "[s]chool desegregation, employment
discrimination, and prisoners' or inmates' rights cases ... as avatars of this new form of
litigation." Id.
299. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113
YALE L.J. 27, 29 (2003); Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation:
The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 417 (1999);
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 377 (1982).
300. In 1978, Owen Fiss wrote a narrative description of private law litigation that
remains a true description of much state court litigation today. "[T]wo people in the state
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dispute resolution does not exhaust the "social function of
courts" 3°0 --even in cases between purely private parties. Within the
confines of certain private disputes, courts may be called on to make
law in a sense akin to the public law function described by Chayes.3°2
Thus, some lawsuits between private parties alleging private
injuries also serve a public law purpose. One hallmark of these
hybrid private/public cases is that remedies granted or denied will
have "important consequences for many persons including
absentees."30 3  Law-making private disputes, like public disputes,
"often have direct implications for people and entities who may not
be parties to the lawsuit."3" Another characteristic of this type of
case is that the litigation, although private, may echo legislative action
or have effects resembling legislative action.3"5 And if the lawsuit
impacts an area of the law where the legislature has already acted to
express a clear public policy, private litigation may affect not only
other potential litigants, but future legislative initiatives as well.
The public law and private law adjudicative models were
developed to describe and analyze the role played by judges in each
type of case. They do not address the scope of any adjudicative duty
that inheres in the judicial office, although Professor Chad Oldfather
has defined such a duty by extracting points of commonality from the
dominant models of the adjudicative process.3 6 Oldfather's analysis
finds a "common, consistent conception of the minimal components
of nature are squabbling over a piece of property, they come to an impasse, and, rather
than resorting to force, turn to a third party, a stranger, for a decision. Courts are but an
institutionalization of the stranger." Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Forward:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1978).
301. Id.
302. Mass tort litigation, for example, evokes aspects of both the public law and private
law models. Linda Mullenix has described modern mass tort litigation as "a new form of
dispute resolution that represents nothing so much as aggregative private legislation often
without the benefit of meaningful representation." Mullenix, supra note 299, at 424; cf.
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision
of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 905-24 (1984) (advocating the application of
public law procedural mechanisms to mass tort litigation).
303. Chayes, supra note 295, at 1302. Class actions are the most obvious example of
this effect; however, this principle is also at work in cases filed by discrete, non-
representative plaintiffs who resemble other similarly situated individuals.
304. Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational
Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 753 (2006).
305. Cf. Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft,
Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16 (2000) (describing "the mixing of public and private lawyering roles"
in mass litigation).
306. Oldfather, supra note 291, at 152.
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of legitimate adjudication." 307 These include: participation by the
parties, judicial responsiveness and attention to the parties'
arguments, a decision based on appropriate criteria, and a candid
explanation of the reasons for the court's decision.3 8
The adjudicative duty identified by Oldfather complements the
obligations imposed on judges by doctrines of justiciability and
decisional minimalism. Together, they recognize a duty to decide that
encompasses more than a duty to adjudicate cases responsively and
with candor. In the most expansive sense, the judicial duty to decide
also includes a responsibility to avoid nonjusticiable issues, an
obligation to decide cases narrowly, a duty to structure decisions so
that they are not unnecessarily preclusive of future legislative or
judicial action, and a duty to respect the democratic process and the
legislative enactments that it produces. This adjudicative duty stands
in opposition to activist judging.
C. Passive Judicial Activism
The term "judicial activism" carries two related negative
connotations.3 9 First, judicial activism is used to describe the
phenomenon "of courts deciding issues they should not decide, issues
that should be left to the 'political process'-of courts stepping in
where there has been no legislative failure .... "310 The second
negative connotation, closely related to the first, is "of courts
implementing their own personal ideology or 'values' through their
decisions rather than simply declaring what 'the law' is." '311 In
combination, these two senses of judicial activism refer to the
politicization of the law through: (1) judicial usurpation of legislative
functions, and (2) judicial failure to squarely and narrowly address
the legal issues presented by the parties.
Accusations of judicial activism are most commonly leveled
against federal courts, both because their power is limited by Article
III of the Constitution3 12 and because they frequently face
constitutional questions. Since state courts have a role in the
development of common law, it is expected that they will have
307. Oldfather, supra note 304, at 758.
308. Id.; see also Oldfather, supra note 291, at 127.




312. See Hershkoff, supra note 265, at 1836-75 (discussing how state judicial practice
differs from the model imposed on federal courts by Article III).
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lawmaking authority in certain areas. In addition, many state
judges-including those in North Carolina-are elected, making them
more politically accountable than their federal counterparts. Despite
this, to the extent that they stray beyond the boundaries of their
power and usurp legislative functions, state courts can fairly be said to
engage in judicial activism.313
Proscriptions against judicial activism at both the federal and
state levels have much in common with Sunstein's decisional
minimalism, as well as with doctrines of justiciability. The respect for
democratic processes that underlies the minimalist approach to
judging strengthens the obligation of judges to tread cautiously when
deciding private legal issues that have drawn much legislative
attention. A similar regard for the role of legislatures is embedded in
the various doctrines of justiciability. When the legislature addresses
an issue and adopts a statutory solution, as North Carolina has done
with predatory lending, concern for that issue is incorporated into the
public policy of the state. A court that ignores such an issue, or that
fails to decide it squarely and narrowly, can rightly be said to have
acted in an activist manner.
Even without attention from the legislature, predatory lending
cases occupy a middle ground between the private law cases and
public law cases described by Fuller and Chayes.314 They involve
private parties, private harms, and private rights. However, like mass
tort cases and class actions, predatory lending cases have a potential
regulatory aspect because successful litigation may constrain the
behavior of businesses who are not parties to the case. Predatory
lending cases also are quasi-public because the court's decision,
particularly a preclusive decision,315 may impact consumers who are
strangers to the litigation. These "law-making" effects of predatory
lending cases may trigger hostility from judges who see themselves as
minimalist or who wish to avoid charges of activism.
313. As a practical matter, state courts are often accused of judicial activism. See, e.g.,
CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN NEVADA: STATE
SUPREME COURT TRUMPS WILL OF THE PEOPLE 1 (2003),
http://www.cfif.orgfhtdocs/legislative-issues/state -issues/nevada-judicial-activism.htm
(last visited Aug. 23, 2008); Michael B. Brennan, Are Courts Becoming Too Activist?,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Oct. 1, 2005, available at http://www.jsonline.com/
story/index.aspx?id=359831.
314. See supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
315. The preclusive effects of a hybrid private/public law case may be broader than the
familiar litigation doctrines of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or stare decisis. As
demonstrated in Skinner, the court's power of judicial review allows it to block future
legislative action as well. See infra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
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However, the issue of predatory lending has not been met with
"legislative failure" in North Carolina. To the contrary, the North
Carolina General Assembly has proactively led the nation in
recognizing the phenomenon of predatory lending and in protecting
North Carolinians by devising effective legislative solutions." 6 The
state legislature has addressed predatory lending in a series of statutes
adopted over a period of eight years.317 Most recently, in the summer
of 2007, the General Assembly adopted five separate statutory
packages dealing with mortgage lending in North Carolina.3"8
The consistency and duration of the state legislature's concern
with predatory mortgage lending defuses any charge of "judicial
activism" that might be leveled at North Carolina courts in this area.
Instead, predatory lending cases, even cases invoking non-statutory
common law remedies, reverberate with legislative intent. This is not
to say that borrowers will always win these cases, only that North
Carolina courts faced with justiciable predatory lending issues have
an affirmative duty to decide these issues squarely on their merits
when possible.
In Melton v. Family First Mortgage Corporation,319 for example,
the court faced a compelling set of facts32° and yet rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the assignee of her mortgage should be liable
for the originator's unfair and deceptive trade practice. Melton is not
a consumer-friendly ruling, yet it is completely consistent with North
Carolina law. In shielding assignees from liability for fraud
committed by the originator of the mortgage, the court's decision
tracked the holder in due course doctrine and North Carolina's
Predatory Lending Law. By refusing to create an ancillary exception
under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the court in
Melton reached an outcome that complements and respects the
legislative decision embodied in the Predatory Lending Law. In
doing so, the court made a clean, straightforward decision on the
merits, following precedent and direction from the state legislature.
316. See supra Part I.C.2.
317. Id.
318. Act of July 4, 2007, ch. 163, sec. 1-2, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 269; Act of July 5, 2007,
ch. 176, sec. 1-3, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 291; Act of Aug. 16, 2007, ch. 351, sec. 1-6, 2007
N.C. Sess. Laws 1065; Act of Aug. 16, 2007, ch. 352, sec. 1-10, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1072;
Act of Aug. 16, 2007, ch. 353, sec. 1-6, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1080.
319. 156 N.C. App. 129, 576 S.E.2d 365 (2003), per curiam, 357 N.C. 573, 597 S.E.2d
672 (2003).
320. The plaintiff alleged that she was drugged by a family member and swindled out
of her home equity with the cooperation of the mortgage originator. Melton, 156 N.C.
App. at 131, 576 S.E.2d at 367-68.
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Predatory lending is an area in which the North Carolina
legislature has perceived the need for consumer protection and
responded with a carefully calibrated set of remedies.321 Since the
legislature expressly declined to provide for assignee liability in this
area, the court might have earned the sobriquet "activist" if it had
disregarded the legislature's guidance and recognized assignee
liability in Melton. Given the legislature's clear statement of public
policy, North Carolina's courts should be similarly reluctant to enter
predatory lending decisions that will preclude future legislative or
judicial action. Unless required and cleanly supported, a predatory
lending decision with preclusive effect, particularly a decision that
goes beyond judicial issue preclusion and precludes future legislative
action, may subvert the legislative will and thus fairly be called
activist.
The majority opinions in Shepard and Skinner illustrate this sort
of activism. The court's interpretation of the statute of limitations in
Shepard blocked judicial action in future predatory lending cases
brought by other similarly situated consumers. 22 Skinner's holding
that the state long-arm statute did not authorize suit against the out-
of-state trust had a comparably preclusive effect. The alternative
holding in Skinner, that the out-of-state trust lacked minimum
contacts to support personal jurisdiction in North Carolina, is even
more broadly preclusive. Not only does the holding foreclose
consideration of this issue by other courts, it cannot be modified or
reversed by the legislature because it is based on the court's
interpretation of the Due Process Clause.323
Shepard and Skinner use procedural doctrines to create this
preclusive effect and avoid reaching the merits of the case. This
strategy superficially appears to evoke Bickel's passive virtues and
Sunstein's decisional minimalism, echoing the familiar uses of
justiciability doctrines and minimalism to constrain judicial power.
However, several key distinctions show that the decisions in Shepard
and Skinner do not model the forms of decisional modesty advocated
by Bickel and Sunstein, but instead represent a form of passive
judicial activism.
321. See supra Part I.C.2.
322. The preclusive effect referenced here results from the doctrine of stare decisis, and
not from issue or claim preclusion. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 10-11 (2001).
323. Because virtually all subprime mortgages are securitized and held by an out-of-
state trust like the defendant in Skinner, this decision impacts a large number of
consumers across North Carolina.
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First, Shepard and Skinner were decided against a backdrop of
sustained and thoughtful legislative action. The North Carolina
General Assembly was quick to realize that the wholesale
securitization of consumer mortgages created a new financial
"technology" and incentives for predatory lending that did not
previously exist. Legal concepts are commonly adapted to reflect
new technologies;324 however, Bickel and Sunstein would caution
judges to make these adaptations carefully, non-preclusively, and with
deference to existing and future legislative solutions.3" The majority
opinions in Shepard and Skinner fail to acknowledge either the
phenomenon of predatory lending or the solutions devised by the
legislature. As a result, despite their apparent passivity, these
decisions have the effect of actively precluding consumer litigation in
an area of persistent legislative concern.
Second, both decisions drew strong dissents that evidenced a
sharp 4-3 split between the justices.326 This lack of accord indicates
that the outcome reached by the majority was not inevitable, was not
clearly controlled by existing precedent, and instead was the product
of judicial discretion.327 Given the high level of legislative interest in
predatory lending and the formidable public policies at issue,328
judicial restraint would caution against the use of procedural
doctrines with a widely-preclusive effect unless these outcomes are
clearly required. The uncompelled use of procedural doctrines to
preclude future litigation of predatory lending cases does not square
with Bickel's passive virtues or Sunstein's decisional minimalism;
instead, it is a form of disguised judicial activism. This is particularly
true of the holding in Skinner, which evades the presumption that
long-arm statutes are liberally construed in favor of finding
jurisdiction3 29 only to add a duplicative and unnecessary due process
324. For example, it has been necessary to adapt many legal concepts to the Internet.
See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-28 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (adapting principles of personal jurisdiction to internet sellers).
325. See supra Part III.A.
326. See supra notes 191-94 and 209-11 and accompanying text.
327. Cf. Recent Case, supra note 216, at 640 (describing the ways in which the
majority's due process analysis "does not accord with settled jurisdictional precedent").
328. The dissents in Shepard and Skinner not only challenge the majority's legal
analysis, they emphasize "the paramount public policy" of protecting consumer borrowers
expressed in the North Carolina General Statutes. Shepard, 361 N.C. at 142, 638 S.E.2d at
201 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2.1 (2005)).
329. See, e.g., Brown v. Ellis, 184 N.C. App. 547, 549, 646 S.E.2d 408, 410-11 (2007);
Strother v. Strother, 120 N.C. App. 393, 395-98, 462 S.E.2d 542, 543-45 (1995).
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analysis that exponentially increases the impact of the court's
holding.33°
Finally, the North Carolina General Assembly's swift response to
Shepard and Skinner offers additional evidence of the activist nature
of these decisions. In August 2007, a mere six months after the
decisions in Shepard and Skinner,33' the General Assembly issued an
unambiguous statement that these decisions had intruded into the
legislature's domain when it ratified House Bill 1374.332 The new law
legislatively overruled Shepard by amending the statute of limitations
to provide that the period for filing a usury action "accrue[s] with
each payment made and accepted on the loan. ' 33  It also amends
North Carolina's long-arm statute to provide for jurisdiction over out-
of-state special purpose trusts like the defendant in Skinner.
3 34
However, because it is impossible for the legislature to overturn the
due process component of the Skinner decision, Skinner's holding will
continue to frustrate the legislature and consumers into the future.
If Shepard and Skinner exemplify a form of passive judicial
activism, the pro-consumer decisions in Richardson and Tillman
employ a pattern of adjudication that is much closer to decisional
minimalism. The claims underlying both Richardson and Tillman
challenged the sale of single-premium credit insurance (SPCI), a
worthless product that mortgage lenders have been unable to sell to
consumer borrowers in North Carolina since July 1, 2000.115
Although the insurance sold in Richardson and Tillman predated this
law, the General Assembly's subsequent prohibition of its sale is a
powerful statement about its lack of value to North Carolina
consumers.
In Richardson, the defendant bank sold insurance that it was not
authorized to sell, violating a statutory prohibition in the heavily
regulated insurance industry to make a profit.336 The placement of
this conduct in the context of consumer mortgages tagged the bank's
behavior as a form of predatory lending-triggering the application of
330. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
331. Shepard and Skinner were decided on December 20, 2006. See supra notes 15-16.
332. Act of Aug. 16, 2007, ch. 351, sec. 1-6,2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1065. House Bill 1374




335. The sale of SPCI is prohibited by section 24-10.2(b) of the North Carolina
General Statutes, added in the 1999 Predatory Lending Law and in effect since July 1,
2000. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2 (2007).
336. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
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a second set of policies under North Carolina law. Thus, although
Richardson involves dispute resolution between private parties, it has
public law overtones because the defendant's behavior flouted North
Carolina's insurance laws and involved a form of credit insurance tied
to predatory lending.
Because the legislature has spoken with such clarity in these two
areas, there was no need for the court to exercise restraint and defer
to the legislative process. Instead, the court had an affirmative duty
to decide the case on its merits, and it complied with this duty in a
minimalist manner. This is not to say that Richardson does not
change North Carolina law. It does. However, Richardson is
minimalist because it resolves the parties' dispute by interpreting
existing law in an area where it had authority to do so. Equally as
important, the court reached a decision that does not foreclose
modification or adaptation of its rules in future decisions or legislative
action. The court decided no more-and no less-than it was
required to do on the facts of the case.
In Tillman, the five justices who joined the plurality were united
by an overarching belief in the unconscionability of the one-sided
arbitration clause at issue.337 Despite their inability to agree on the
appropriate test for unconscionability in North Carolina, these five
justices were in accord that whatever test was used, the arbitration
clause at issue in Tillman was unconscionable because it "prevented
plaintiffs from vindicating their rights under the contract in any
forum," '338 while leaving the defendants free to pursue claims against
borrowers in court. The key to this finding was the plurality's
particularized focus on the plaintiffs and their financial
circumstances.339 The plurality viewed the case as an instance of
337. Tillman, 362 N.C. at 102, 655 S.E.2d at 370. Three justices adopted the rule that a
party asserting unconscionability must prove both procedural and substantive
unconscionability. Id. Two justices concurred in the result, but wrote separately to state
their belief that the court should apply the totality of the circumstances test set out in
Brenner. Id. at 109, 655 S.E.2d at 374 (Edmunds, J., concurring); see supra notes 254-56
and accompanying text.
338. Tillman, 362 N.C. at 110, 655 S.E.2d at 374 (Edmunds, J., concurring). Justice
Timmons-Goodson makes a nearly identical finding in her opinion, finding the arbitration
clause unenforceable because it "simply does not allow for the meaningful redress of
grievances." Id. at 109, 655 S.E.2d at 373-74.
339. The plurality opinions focus on the plaintiffs' inability to pay the high costs of
arbitration. For example, Justice Timmons-Goodson writes: "In terms of ability to pay,
the evidence of plaintiffs' limited financial means is uncontested. Plaintiffs live paycheck
to paycheck and usually have very little money left in their bank accounts after paying
their monthly bills." Id. at 104, 655 S.E.2d at 371.
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dispute resolution involving specific plaintiffs, specific defendants,
and a specific contract.
The dissent, in contrast, viewed Tillman as involving nothing less
than "bedrock principles of contract law which should not be
disturbed in response to policy concerns over a disfavored
industry."3" The case was not about specific plaintiffs, but rather
about larger issues, including the freedom to contract and the
illegitimacy of judicial interference with private bargains.341 In the
dissent's view, a contract is unconscionable only if "the contracting
party is denied any opportunity for a meaningful choice. 3 42 In other
words, so long as the plaintiffs could have obtained another mortgage
without an arbitration clause, there was no inequality of bargaining
power, and the clause at issue could not be found unconscionable.
The dissent's myopic focus on protecting contracts from judicial
interference allowed it to ignore the nature of the specific contract at
issue in Tillman. And it allowed the dissent to disregard the
legislative concerns embodied in North Carolina's predatory lending
laws. With respect to consumer mortgages, it is no longer the law in
North Carolina that "even 'though [a] contract was a foolish one, it
would hold in law.' "I3" In the more innocent time when that
statement was written, there was a presumption that the parties to a
bargain had equal information and equal incentives to act rationally.
This is no longer true of some consumer mortgage loans, and the
General Assembly has recognized this fact and acted to protect
consumers from abusive and predatory mortgages.
Although the loans in Tillman predate the enactment of these
laws,3" North Carolina's strong legislative focus on predatory lending
supports the plurality's decision in the case. Because the plurality is
following the legislature's lead, the pro-consumer outcome they
achieve is not vulnerable to charges of judicial activism. Instead, the
plurality is following the legislature's lead by implicitly recognizing
the changed nature of consumer mortgage lending in North Carolina
340. Id. at 111, 655 S.E.2d at 375 (Newby, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 114-15, 655 S.E.2d at 377. In support of this principle, the dissent quotes
five North Carolina cases dating from 1874 to 1958: Alford v. Textile Ins. Co., 248 N.C.
224,103 S.E.2d 8 (1958); Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N.C. 406, 35 S.E.2d 277 (1945); Peoples
Bank & Tr. Co. v. Mackorell, 195 N.C. 741, 143 S.E. 518 (1928); Powers v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 186 N.C. 336, 119 S.E. 481 (1923); Norfleet v. Cromwell, 70 N.C. 634, 1874 WL 2479
(1874). Each of these quotes focused on the court's hands-off role in contract
interpretation.
342. Tillman, 362 N.C. at 116, 655 S.E.2d at 378.
343. Id. at 116, 655 S.E.2d at 377 (quoting Norfleet, 70 N.C. at 641).
344. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
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and adapting the law to these changes. Against this background of
legislative activity, the plurality's decision is a model of decisional
minimalism because it decides only the specific dispute before the
court: whether the arbitration clause used by the defendant is
unconscionable. Collectively, the justices in the plurality reach a
result that decides no more and no less than needs to be decided. 5
CONCLUSION
In addition to House Bill 1374, the North Carolina General
Assembly passed four other bills addressing consumer mortgage
lending in the summer of 2007.346 The legislature's focus is evidence
that it sees predatory mortgage lending as a serious and continuing
problem in North Carolina. In addition, however, the legislature was
explicitly attempting to overturn the Supreme Court of North
Carolina's 4-3 decisions in Shepard and Skinner, decisions it saw as
frustrating important legislative initiatives in an area of deep concern.
Since 1999, the General Assembly has recognized the ways in
which widespread securitization has changed the nature of consumer
mortgage lending by allowing lenders to externalize transactional
risks. As a result, North Carolina has led the nation in creating
legislation to protect consumers from the harmful effects of this new
financial technology. The North Carolina courts have adapted more
slowly to the impact of securitization and issued decisions in Shepard
and Skinner that run counter to the legislature's lead. Because these
decisions undercut the legislature's initiatives and, in the case of
Skinner, had a broadly preclusive effect that cannot be modified by
the legislature, they express a form of judicial activism, albeit a
passive form.
345. The differences between the two plurality opinions can be explained in terms of
decisional modesty, as the points of disagreement between the justices arise when
explaining the common outcome on which all agree.
346. Act of July 4,2007, ch. 163, sec. 1-2,2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 269; Act of July 5,2007,
ch. 176, sec. 1-3, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 291; Act of Aug. 16, 2007, ch. 351, sec. 1-6, 2007
N.C. Sess. Laws 1065; Act of Aug. 16, 2007, ch. 352, sec. 1-10, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1072;
Act of Aug. 16, 2007, ch. 353, sec. 1-6, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1080. In the summer of 2008,
the General Assembly passed three additional bills impacting consumer mortgage lending
in North Carolina. Act of Aug. 17, 2008, ch. 226, sec. 1-6, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws __
(creating an Emergency Foreclosure Reduction Program and adding additional
foreclosure requirements for subprime loans made after December 31, 2004 and before
December 31, 2007), Act of Aug. 17, 2008, ch. 227, sec. 1-4, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws __
(amending various statutes to regulate mortgage servicers), Act of Aug. 17, 2008, ch. 228,
sec. 1-14, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws __ (amending the Mortgage Lending Law to give the
North Carolina Commissioner of Banks regulatory authority over mortgage servicers).
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The essence of judicial activism is usurpation of the legislative
function. A judicial decision is not activist simply because it employs
the power of judicial review or decides a case in a way that appears to
be pro-consumer or pro-business. Rather, a judicial decision can
properly be seen as activist only when it supplants or subverts the
legislature's role-either by interfering with the legislative function
outside the boundaries of judicial review, or by deciding cases in a
way that prevents the legislature from acting. Under this definition,
Shepard and particularly Skinner are activist decisions.
Melton, Richardson, and Tillman, on the other hand, take a
minimalist approach to adjudication that better fulfills the courts'
decisional duty. These decisions are not unnecessarily preclusive of
future legislative or judicial action. Instead, they respect the
democratic process and the legislative initiatives that it has produced
to combat predatory lending. These decisions squarely address the
issues presented by the parties, decide them narrowly, and follow the
legislature's lead in adapting North Carolina law to the new
technology of securitization.
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